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ABSTRACT 
THE ROLE OF NATURAL RESOURCES DURING THE 
STATE BUILDING PROCESS: THE CASE OF IRAQ
Tulun, Teoman Ertuğrul
M.A., DEPARTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
SUPERVISOR:  Asst. Prof. Pınar İpek
September 2009
This  thesis  evaluates  the  relevance  of  natural  resources  during  the  state 
building process. In order to achieve its aim the thesis provides the reader with the 
relevant definitions. These include the definitions of state, nation building and state 
building. The thesis looks at the theories of state building. These are the Fast- Track 
Democratization, Security Firsters and Slow Democratization. It then provides the 
historical and current context of state building activities. It covers state building and 
the major state building actors since the end of World War One. Germany, Japan, 
Vietnam, Belgian Congo, and Bosnia  as well as  the role of United Nations, the 
United States of America and the European Countries and institutions are briefly 
given as examples of state building in different historical periods. This is continued 
by the analyses of state building activities in Iraq, from its inception until today. The 
case of Iraq is used to analyze the relevance of natural resources in the state building 
process.  In  conclusion,  this  thesis  demonstrates  that  natural  resources  play  an 
important role in Iraq´s state building process while a success depends on how the 
distribution, management and ownership of oil and gas resources will evolve.
 Keywords: State, State Building, Nation Building, Iraq, Energy, Natural Resources.
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ÖZET
DEVLET İNŞAASI SÜRECİNDE  
DOĞAL KAYNAKLARIN  ROLU: IRAK
Tulun, Teoman Ertuğrul
Yüksek Lisans, Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü 
Tez Yöneticisi: Yrd. Doç. Dr. Pınar İpek
Eylül 2009
Bu  çalışma,  devlet  inşaası  sürecinde  doğal  kaynakların  rolünü 
değerlendirmektedir.  Bu  hedefe  ulaşmak  amacıyla,  ilgili  terimlerin  tanımları 
okuyucuya  sunulmuştur.  Buna,  devlet,  ulus  inşaası  ve  devlet  inşaası  terimleri 
dahildir. Bu tez, devlet inşaası kuramlarını da incelemektedir. Bunlar sırasıyla Hızlı 
Demokratikleşme  Kuramı,  Güvenlik  Odaklı  Kuram  ve  Yavaş  Demokratikleşme 
Kuramlarıdır. Birinci Dünya Savaşı'ndan günümüze kadarki devlet inşaası süreçleri 
anlatılmaktadır.  Bu incelemeler, Birleşmiş Milletler, Amerika Birleşik Devletleri ve 
Avrupa  ülkeleri  gibi  devlet  inşaası  sürecine  girişen  aktörleri  de  kapsamaktadır. 
Bilahare,  yerel  ve  uluslararası  aktörler  tarafından  tarihi  boyunca  Irak'ta  girişilen 
devlet  inşaası  süreci  incelenmiştir.  Irak   sürecinin  incelenmesindeki  amaç,  doğal 
kaynakların devlet inşaası sürecinde oynadığı role ışık tutmaktır. Sonuç olarak, bu 
tez  doğal  kaynakların  Irak'ın  devlet  inşaası  sürecinde önemli  bir  rol  oynadığını 
gösterirken,  sürecin  başarılı  bir  şekilde  sonuçlanmasının  petrol  ve  doğal  gaz 
kaynaklarının  dağıtımında,  idaresinde  ve  sahipliğinde  kaydedilecek  gelişmelere 
bağlı olduğu üzerinde de durmuştur. 
Anahtar  Kelimeler:  Devlet,  Devlet  İnşaası,  Ulus  İnşaası,  Irak,  Enerji,  Doğal 
Kaynaklar.
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CHAPTER I
 INTRODUCTION
The recent historical developments brought on the demand for questioning 
the sacred nature of the state. With the development of technology and deepening of 
globalization,  the  collectivist  structure  of  the  society  was  changing  into  an 
individualist one, thus, the view on the meaning and place of the state began to be 
discussed both in  international relations and political circles. Once the state was 
seen as the protector of the individual against the tyranny of the market forces and of 
other individuals, organizations or states. Yet by the 1990s it was being seen as a 
unit that constrained the individual. It was seen as limiting the  freedom and the 
potential of the individual. 
Thus  came  the  limiting  of  state  responsibilities,  power  and  function 
particularly in social and economic spheres. For example in the social field, from the 
1990s onwards, the welfare systems began to be dismantled. The Non-Governmental 
Organizations (NGOs) are promoted to replace the social and economic functions of 
the state and the emphasis on human rights that would carry the world into the new 
millennium.
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Yet by the beginning of the new millennium, the reality did not match the 
hopes.  The  world  was  in  constant  economic  crisis.  Politically  it  had  witnessed 
intolerable violence on several fronts. Institutions which were supposed to replace 
the functions of states were not able to carry the burden thrust upon them. These 
were followed by the resurgence of the concept of failed states.  Distance was not 
enough anymore to protect a nation from the negative affects of local or regional 
conflicts.  The  world  witnessed  the  effects  of  missing  state  institutions,  with 
genocides such as in Bosnia. The importance of state was especially seen in regions 
where state collapse had produced a dangerous environment. Thus, the term “state 
building” re-emerged from its post-World War One hiatus.
Within  this  framework,  this  thesis  examines  the  re-emergence  of  state 
building  efforts  in  the  post-Cold  War  era  and specifically  the  case  of  Iraq.  The 
importance of natural resources in collapsed states is a specific concern not only to 
the state of the region in question but also to the international community. Due to the 
challenges in securing energy supplies, natural resources in collapsed states could 
have destabilizing affect in the world energy market and this could translate into 
international instability. 
Thus, the case of Iraq is important to examine the conditions under which 
state  building  processes  are  influenced.  First,  its  history demonstrates  that  Iraq's 
past, present and future has been a product of its natural resources, namely oil and 
gas. 
Second, Iraq presents a case to question the role of national identity in state 
building process. Iraq since its inception has been marred with sectarian and ethnic 
violence. Third, its state collapse that occurred as a result of the 2003 US invasion 
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and its natural resources have a significant impact on the region and the international 
community at large.
Excluding the introduction and conclusion,  the thesis  is divided into three 
chapters. The second chapter contains the theoretical foundations of the thesis. It is 
divided  into  five  sections.  It  presents  the  relevant  definitions,  the  theoretical 
approaches and the history of state building. The examples of state building process 
are  investigated  in  the  light  of  three  factors.  These  are  namely,  the  level  of 
engagement  of  the  state  builder,  the  importance  of  legitimacy  and  the  role  of 
regional factors.
The third chapter presents the state building history of Iraq.  It  covers the 
period starting from the invasion of three provinces of the Ottoman Empire by the 
British Force and ends with the 2003 invasion. State building activities during this 
period has been done by external (British Imperial  Administration) and domestic 
actors. Thus, in addition to the above mentioned factors, this chapter examines three 
contingent factors in the historical trajectory of state building in Iraq. These are the 
importance of the army, identity and oil. The fourth chapter examines Iraq's state 
building process since the 2003 invasion, by utilizing the same analytical framework 
presented in chapter three. A constitution provides the framework and the foundation 
on which a state is built. It effects every aspect of the state and its subjects. Thus, a 
special emphasis is given for the constitution of Iraq.
3
CHAPTER II
THE FOUNDATION
This chapter defines the terms and concepts that are used in the thesis. In the 
second section the theoretical approaches are introduced. Other sections will deal 
with the history of the state building concept.
2.1 Definitions
Before embarking on any investigation, it is prudent to provide definitions 
for the key concepts to be used. The following concepts, namely "the state" and 
"state building" are defined below according to the literature review. 
2.1.1 The State
In political science one of the most prominent definitions used for the term 
"the state"  was  coined by Max Weber.  According to  Weber,  the state: "...  is  the 
human  community  that,  within  a  defined  territory—  and  the  key  word  here  is 
“territory”— (successfully)  claims  the  monopoly  of  legitimate  force  for  itself..." 
(Weber, 1919: 156).
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Useful as this, the aforementioned definition needs additions to serve our 
purposes.  The  main  reason for  this  need  is  the  fact  that,  since  1918,  our  world 
has evolved and so did the definition of what a state is. Unlike the beginning of the 
20th century,  the  state  does  not  only  fulfill  security  needs  of  the  population  it 
encompasses. For example, the state is no longer a mere bystander in social issues. A 
state is also an entity that can regulate, extract, appropriate or use resources in order 
to fulfill its functions. (Robinson, 2007: 3; Bräutigam, 2008: 2).Thus there are two 
main functions of a state. First, it needs to provide security for its citizens. Second, it 
needs  to  promote  social  and  economic  well  being,  and  the  development  of  its 
citizens. 
Within this framework, the state is an entity that provides security to, and 
attempts to promote the social and economic well being, and development of its 
citizens.1
2.1.2 State Building
The second concept that  requires a definition is State Building.  There are 
many approaches to the concept of state building, and furthermore some studies also 
refer to the state building process by using different terminology (Dobbins et al., 
2008: xv-xvi).2 
1 Even though this thesis will discuss democratic state building, the definition of the state or state 
building will not be formulated in a manner to involve the notion of democracy. For a state does 
not have to be a democracy (World Bank, 2005: 46). Throughout history there have been states 
that had different regimes. This issue will be discussed more thoroughly in the last section of 
Chapter 2.
2 State building in the context of the United Nations (UN) is referred to as peace building. In the 
context of Europe it is referred to as State Building. And in the context of American politics it is 
referred to as Nation Building (Dobbins et al., 2008: xv-xvi). There will be a detailed discussion 
at the final section of Chapter 2, as to why I consider them to be different terms. Further the logic 
behind my usage will be explained as well.
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In very simple terms, state building can be defined as "... the creation of new 
government  institutions  and strengthening of  existing ones...".  (Fukuyama,  2004: 
ix). Yet as with the definition of the term state, many definitions of the concept of 
state building, are either too simplistic or too narrow (Bräutigam, 2008: 2). 
State building is a process that increases or creates fiscal, administrative, and 
institutional capacity of governments to provide security to,  and  to promote the 
social and economic well being and development of  its citizens.
2.2 Theoretical Approaches To State Building
There  are  three  theoretical  approaches  in  relation  to  the  state  building 
concept. The first is the “Fast – Track  Democratization” (FTD) argument. There are 
two other approaches that disagree with the aforementioned argument. These are the 
“Security  Firsters”  (SF)  and  the  “Slow  Democratizers”  (SD)  (Hampson  and 
Mendeloff, 2007: 679-680).
In order to understand the differences between these approaches,  one can 
examine them in the light of four fundamental elements. The first element is that 
they are influenced by the writings of different political philosophers. Some of the 
philosophers that have affected the above mentioned approaches are respectively, 
John Locke, Thomas Hobbes and John Stuart Mill (Hampson and Mendeloff, 2007: 
679-681).  The second element is  their  view on the concept  of “state of nature”. 
Since they incorporate ideas from different philosophers, they each have a different 
view on the “state of nature” of human beings.3 This in turn effects the third element, 
assumptions  about  the  culture  and the  peoples  who are  the  subjects  of  the state 
3 State of Nature can be defined as the state human beings have lived before they created a polity.
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building process. Finally, the aforementioned element effects the methods employed 
during  the  state  building  project,  the  fourth  element.  (Hampson  and  Mendeloff, 
2007: 679-697).
2.2.1 The Fast – Track Democratization
The writings of traditional liberal writers such as John Locke are important to 
understand the philosophical foundations and the assumptions about the “state of 
nature” in this approach (Hampson and Mendeloff, 2007: 679-697).4  
For Locke in  the "state of nature"  human beings live in perfect  freedom. 
They alone take decisions regarding their life and they decide their own fate. Locke 
also considers this state as the "state of equality". Since everybody is equal in the 
state of nature, they also posses the same faculties. Thus by nature, human beings 
use reason and reason would dictate that no individual would harm anyone else. 
This is referred to as the "Law of Nature". 
It is possible for "state of nature" to turn into "state of war", even though it is 
not the usual state of affairs. If the "Law of Nature", which governs the state of 
nature is  broken in any way,  individuals must defend themselves and punish the 
transgressors.  Their  duty  to  punish  the  guilty  party  is  not  just  about  protecting 
themselves, but they must do it because the unlawful actions have hurt the species as 
a whole.5 
4 Traditional liberal theorists such as John Locke argue human beings overwhelmingly and most of 
the time act with pure intentions. (Locke, 1980). 
5 Lock's belief in the  Law of Nature is significantly effected by the concept of Monotheism. The 
idea that human beings were created by a singular god (Ashcraft, 1999: 238). Thus at times, his 
ideas are unrelenting and uncompromising. Furthermore,  one can extrapolate from the concept 
"Law of Nature" that any polity founded on contradictory principles does not have legitimacy 
(Locke, 1980: 12). At least in theory, the FTDs also believe that all nations must adhere to their 
version of government.
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Despite the perfect freedom provided in "the state of nature", because of rare 
but still possible occurrences of conflict, individuals would be willing to create a 
civil  society/political  society.  This  would  entail  relinquishing  some  of  their 
freedoms, with which they would gladly comply.  In the political society, to achieve 
the desired goal,  the political  body must  be governed by the body itself.  Hence 
emerges the concept of "consent of the majority" (Lock, 1980: 52; Ashcraft, 1999: 
238;  Hampson and Mendeloff, 2007: 681-682).
The FTDs built  their  theoretical  approach towards nation building on the 
assumption of liberal democratic theory. The FTDs believe that since overwhelming 
number of individuals are somewhat like the individuals in Locke's "state of nature", 
a  democratic  state  building  project  would  not  require  a  Herculean  effort. 
Furthermore, in the policy arena FTDs perceive that it's a responsibility to engage 
against the transgressors worldwide.6 The FTDs belief that due to inherit nature of 
humans, democratic societies can be created with limited effort. 
This  belief  in  the  subconscious  desire  for  democratic  rule,  in  turn  has 
effected their perception on the desired methods used for intervention. In one of the 
reference  work  of  FTDs,  four  methods  are  recommended  for  successful 
intervention.7 First, the intervening power has to commit significant military, civilian 
6 This feeling of responsibility can be seen in 2002 National Security Strategy (NSS) of the Bush 
Administration. The 2002 NSS, and the approach of Bush Administration itself to the idea of state 
building can be considered as a modern example of the traditional liberals and consequently the 
FTDs.  However  it  should  be  noted  that  certain  liberal  theoreticians  such  as  Immanuel  Kant 
cautioned against such aggressive policies.  Immanuel Kant argued that wars that aimed to spread 
democracies  could  have  adverse  effects  for  the  war-waging  democratic  states  themselves. 
(Hampson and Mendeloff, 2007: 682-683; Kant, 1991:164-171, 266).
7 Dobbins et al. , 2003.
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and  financial  resources.8 Second,  multilateral  interventions  tend  to  yield  more 
positive  results.9 Third,  if  the  intervening  parties  are  willing  for  a  long  term 
commitment, the resolution of the injustices committed in the past could be helpful 
in  the  state  building  process.  Fourth,  there  will  be  less  causalties  if  the 
interventionist  forces  are  large  enough  to  maintain  order  amongst  the  local 
population. (Hampson and Mendeloff, 2007: 685; Dobbins et al. , 2003: xx, xxi, xxv, 
xxvi, 20, 146, 165, 166).
2.2.2 Security Firsters
Despite the fact that FTDs effect on the international scene, there are views 
that have come to challenge it in regard to recent developments. One of them being 
the perceived failure of the intervention in Iraq and in Afghanistan. The proponents 
of one of these approaches are referred to as the "Security Firsters" (Hampson and 
Mendeloff, 2007: 686).
The SFs have been also effected by different political theorists. The writings 
of Thomas Hobbes can be used as an example for describing the assumptions and 
the theoretical foundations of the SF approach. 
According to Hobbes, in the state of nature, human beings are free and have 
the will to do anything to survive. Hence he characterizes human existence in the 
state of nature as "solitary, poore, brutish and short" (Hobbes, 2001; 89). Thus in 
such  an  environment  no  individual  is  safe.  In  order  to  avoid  this  dilemma, 
individuals would relinquish some of their rights to a political entity, the Leviathan. 
8 It  is argued that since democracy can be transferable to any society,  one only needs the right 
amount of resources.
9 They also cost less, but present a much more complicated endeavor
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This  in  turn  would  guarantee  its  subjects  physical  security  (Hampson  and 
Mendeloff, 2007: 687; Hobbes, 2001: 91).
The SFs argue when states fail, the physical security of most or in some cases 
all of its citizens are put in jeopardy. Thus, we observe the creation of armed groups 
which in turn causes the conflict to further escalate. Unlike in an interstate war, the 
cycle of violence in intrastate war rarely ends at the negotiating table. The parties do 
not believe the terms of negotiation could be upheld since there is no viable state 
that could enforce them (Hampson and Mendeloff, 2007: 687; Walter, 1997: 336-
337; Walter, 1999: 129). 
Thus the  SFs hold the  belief  that  the  primary objective  of  state  building 
process is solving the security problems. To achieve this in some cases, transition to 
democracy can be delayed for some time or could be shelved indefinitely. In the 
past, similar arguments were made by authors such as Samuel Huntington. He too 
believed in the importance of security. Also, democratic rule was not high on his list 
of  priorities  (Hampson  and  Mendeloff,  2007:  688;  Ipek,  2007;  Fukuyama, 
1997:215).
2.2.3 Slow Democratizers
The last approach that presents the middle way could be described as a much 
more  measured,  or  conciliatory  approach.  In  the  debate  of  state  building,  the 
supporters of this approach can be coined as the "Slow Democratizers"  (Hampson 
and Mendeloff, 2007: 689). 
The SDs take their fundamental  theoretical elements from writers such as 
John Stuart Mill.  Mill,  just like the SDs, can be positioned  between Locke and 
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Hobbes.  Unlike Locke or Hobbes, Mill was not a proponent of starting a political 
debate from the point of state of nature. He believed that since human beings were 
born in a polity, it did not serve any purpose to start the academic inquiry from the 
point of state of nature. Thus, from his discussions one can extrapolate that he does 
not  necessarily  believe  that  human  beings  are  docile  or  aggressive  by  nature. 
Whatever humans or societies in turn become, the issue resides more in how they are 
educated (Mill, 1904: 30-33; Ryan, 1998: 530).
Continuing  in  this  line  of  thinking,  Mill  warned  against  the  dangers  of 
unregulated democracy. This could cause the oppressive rule of a majority, which he 
referred as the "tyranny of the magistrate". In his opinion there had to be guarantees 
so that non-mainstream ideas could be expressed (Hampson and Mendeloff, 2007: 
690).
Within this framework, the SDs believe that the immediate establishment of 
democracies is not viable. In the absence of proper groundwork, there is a significant 
chance  that  attempting  to  establish  a  democracy  in  a  society  with  limited  prior 
experience would eventually create a "mob rule" (Hampson and Mendeloff, 2007: 
690; Mansfield and Snyder, 2005).
In line with this theoretical background, the SDs methods of state building 
can be stated in four points. First, state building requires a state. Only when political 
institutions have been established and are operating with certain efficiency, can the 
state building project progress successfully. This can be seen both in the cases of 
Japan and Germany after  World  War  Two (WWII).  In  both countries  the highly 
efficient administrative apparatus was left intact (Hampson and Mendeloff, 2007: 
690-692;  Fukuyama,  2004:  51-52).  Second,  whether  it  be  the  media,  the  non-
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governmental organizations (NGOs) or other elements of the civil society, they have 
to be educated for the state building process to complete. Third, the introduction of 
democratic elements in the society could be postponed until the first two elements 
had made some headway.10 Fourth, in case of total state failure, all this could be 
done with the help of an international  trustee.  Meaning; an outside power could 
provide  the  necessary  state  functions  until  the  collapsed  state's  institutions  are 
rebuilt. This idea of "international trusteeship" or in some cases "shared sovereignty" 
can either be imposed on a  nation or it  can be voluntary.  It  can be related to a 
specific area, such as economic stewardship, or it can encompass all of the functions 
of  a  state  (Hampson  and  Mendeloff,  2007:  692-693;  Krasner,  2005:  70,76-79; 
Krasner, 2004: 86,97-120; Fearon and Laitin, 2004: 9-14) .
2.3 Why State Building And Not Nation Building?
In the case of the concepts of "state building" and "nation building", there is 
not  just  a  subtle  difference,  but  a  significant  one.  Conceptual  labeling  requires 
special attention because different concepts effect how one perceives, thinks, and 
analyzes a problem. Different academicians have different approaches to this issue. 
Below the arguments of three important scholars in the state building debate are 
presented.
James  Dobbins  of  the  RAND Corporation  argues  that,  there  is  really  no 
difference  between  any  of  the  following  three  concepts:  state  building,  nation 
10 It should be noted that, unlike SFs, for SDs, the non-democratic nature of the government during 
the transition period is a temporary phenomenon Any limitation on the freedoms of the people 
must be for the purpose of establishing a democracy in the future. This was Mill's argument as 
well. Unlike SDs, for SFs democracy can sometimes be forsaken for stability. Again unlike SDs, 
FTDs believe  democratic  governance must  established  from the beginning,  regardless  of  any 
special circumstances (Hampson and Mendeloff, 2007: 692; Locke, 1980: 12; Mill, 1998: 14-15).
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building, peace building.11 He does not enter into any detail about the difference 
between  nation  and  state.  Furthermore  he  does  not  believe  this  to  be  a  useful 
exercise. He accepts the term nation building because it is more commonly used in 
the American state building literature (Dobbins et al., 2008: xv-xvi).
Another scholar, Francis Fukuyama follows a similar path, but does try to 
explain the usage from an American perspective. He argues that due to the American 
experience in the creation of USA, the Americans refer to state building process with 
economic development as nation building (Fukuyama, 2006: 3-4).
It should be noted that, the American experience of creating a new nation 
from the combination of different people under one state is a unique experience. It 
could be counter-productive to set off to state building project with this experience 
in mind, because every nation is different from each other. In fact, the focus is not 
"nation" but the "state". 
This is where the definitions come in. As previously stated "...the State is an 
entity that provides security to, and attempts to promote the social and economic 
well being and development of, its citizens...".
Yet  the  definition  of  nation,  as  Simon  Chesterman  points  out  is  quite 
different. A nation is a collective that shares common customs, origins, history, and 
frequently language (Chesterman, 2005: 4-5).12 In none of the activities conducted in 
state building efforts after 1945 can one observe an attempt at creating the elements 
11 Instead of the term state  building,  some, such as  the United Nations,  utilize the term “peace 
building”. Yet the term peace building is a term that describes a far broader range of activities 
then "state building" (Chesterman, 2005: 4-5)  The topic on definitions does merit a more through 
discussion. Yet in order not lose the focus of the thesis´ question, the term "state building" was 
used.
12 Some scholars could find this definition vague and too general. It is true that the term "nation", 
historically, is an important term. It is true that it merits more discussion. However, in order not to 
lose focus on the thesis, this general description will have to serve our needs. 
13
provided in the definition of nation. This why the term state building is being used in 
the context of this thesis.
2.4 State Building, The History
After having investigated the different theoretical  approaches to the issue, 
this  section  examines  the  historical  cases  of  state  building.  If  one  attempts  to 
categorize the history of "state building", WWII can be considered a benchmark.
Prior to WWII,  there were operations conducted by states or international 
organizations  in  different  international  arenas.  However,  they  were  considerably 
different in nature when compared to current "state building" practices. 
2.4.1 Pre-WWII Era
In the Pre-WWII era, there were three types of operations that predated the 
concept of "state building". They are different from the concept of "state building" 
because none of them intended to build, rebuild, or strengthen the state capacities of 
the region in  which they were conducted.  They were either  created to  serve the 
purposes  of  an occupying power,  or  were merely rudimentary efforts  at  conflict 
resolution or Confidence Building Measures (CBMs).13
The first system was called The Mandates System. The Ottoman possessions 
in the Middle East and the German territories in Africa and the Pacific are examples 
of  this  system. The major  difference between the Mandate  System and the state 
building projects of today is, state building projects, if not totally, are mostly made 
13 Confidence  Building  Measures  are  agreements  between  parties  regarding  the  exchange  of 
information and increase of transparency which aim to decrease the fears of the actors involved, 
for the purpose of preventing the outbreak of a conflict. CBMs  do not have to necessarily deal 
with reduction of arms (Asada, 1988: 489; Nye, 1984: 401-414).
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to benefit the people in question. The "mandate system" seemed to serve more the 
interests  of the European powers such as France and United Kingdom. It  was a 
method to extend their empires. The wishes or interests of the local populations were 
mostly disregarded ( Chesterman, 2005: 13-18).
The second system involved the League of Nations (LoN). Some territories 
were administered by the LoN under the Treaty of Versailles. The Saar Basin, the 
city of Danzig and Upper Silesia were the examples of this exercise.14 The common 
element in these examples is that they bare more similarity to CBMs. 
From  these  examples,  the  Saar  Basin  example  is  worth  investigating. 
Officially, the Basin was, until 1935,  administrated by the LoN. However, the LoN 
never engaged in state building activities. Economic activities, such as the coal 
mines, were controlled by the French and the population mostly administered itself 
(Chesterman, 2005: 18-22).
The  third  system was  the  quasi-administrative  activity  by  the  LoN.  The 
Memel territory in todays Lithuania and Leticia in Colombia fell under this category. 
They had two main characteristics. First, they were both issues outside the Treaty of 
Versailles.  And second, they were an attempt at  conflict  resolution (Chesterman, 
2005: 22-25).
2.4.2 Post-World War II Era
After  WWII,  we  began  to  see   what  we  can  refer  to  as  state  building 
activities. WWII, destructive as it was, had changed the landscape of international 
14 Saar  Basin  geographically corresponds to  current  day German state  of  Saarland.  The  city of 
Danzig is located in current day Poland. Upper Silesia is located in current day Poland and the 
Czech Republic.
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politics. Two new powers, the USA  and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 
(USSR)  had  emerged  from the  ashes  of  war  and  a  new balance  of  power  was 
created. Colonial powers started to lose their overseas possessions. United Nations 
(UN) was established to serve the purpose of avoiding the escalation of conflicts 
into war, and to promote an environment of international collaboration. 
It was in such an environment in which the world has witnessed four major 
state building projects until  1989, the end of the Cold War.  These concerned the 
following countries:  Germany (1945-1955),  Japan (  1945-1952),  Vietnam (1954-
1968) and Congo (1960-1964). The aforementioned cases have various similarities 
and differences. Five  features can be provided to describe these similarities and 
differences. 
First, of these four, Germany and Japan were a success.15 In fact, today, the 
end result of these two cases are regarded as what state building should accomplish. 
The other two projects had different results. Vietnam was a failure and Congo was a 
partial success.16
Second, different countries were involved in two of these projects, Germany 
and Congo respectively.  Thus they could be considered multilateral projects. The 
other two, Japan and Vietnam, were unilateral projects conducted by the USA. 
15 The cases of Germany and Japan are considered as a success from two different aspects. First, 
from the definition of state building provided in the first section of this chapter. The state building 
process indeed increased the fiscal, administrative and institutional capacity of the state to serve 
its citizens. Second aspect, from which these examples can be considered as a success, is the three 
theoretical approaches presented in this chapter. The FTDs believe that democracy can be easily 
transferred or established in nations with limited democratic tradition. The Germany and Japan 
case did verify this argument. For the SFs, the state building process requires security. In these 
two cases, it could be argued that the state building process progressed with relative ease because 
of the secure environment in which they were conducted. From the perspective of  SDs, these 
cases also validate their argument about the importance of economic and social aspects of the 
state building process.
16 It should be noted that when we state that Vietnam project was a failure, we refer to the Republic 
of Vietnam (which  was also known as South Vietnam).
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Third,  these four  endeavors  were  undertaken under  different  international 
conditions. The operations in Germany and Japan were conducted right after a major 
war, and the necessary troops and personel were already stationed there. In the case 
of Vietnam and Congo a foreign power or powers had to intervene  and send in the 
necessary  personel outside of a major war.
Fourth, in each case  the level of embededness of the state institutions in 
domestic structures varied. Despite coming out of a war, Germany's and Japan's state 
infrastructures were still present. Thus the occupying powers had something to start 
with, especially with the case of Japan. In the case of Vietnam, even if the state 
institutions or state traditions were not as efficient as in Germany and Japan, they 
had long, deep, and rich history of self-government. The case of Congo was different 
however. After the Belgian withdrawal, what was left of the state institutions had 
collapsed immediately (Carter, 2008:37-42; Chesterman, 2005: 83-84; Dobbins et al. 
, 2005: 5-9).
Fifth, due to the nature of the environment in which the state building efforts 
were conducted and the conditions prior to state building were different, the methods 
varied.  In the case of  Germany and Japan,  no military operations were required 
because this had already been done during the war. Thus, intervening powers could 
focus only on the task of state building. Yet in the case of Vietnam and Congo the 
State Building process had to advance as the fighting continued. Furthermore,  the 
cases  of  Vietnam  and  Congo  represent  two  states  that  had  emerged  from 
imperialistic rule. Yet Germany and Japan, were both established powers with potent 
ideologies that had lost an interstate conflict.
Having provided a general notion about the four cases of state building after 
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WWII, they should now be individually investigated.
2.4.2.1 Germany
In the case of Germany, the Allies were faced with several challenges.  These 
were in the fields of security, the humanitarian conditions,  and the state apparatus. 
Since the German army was going to be disbanded, a significant Allied military 
presence was required in Germany to establish and maintain order. The issue was 
further  complicated  by the fact  that  troops  were needed in  Asia  to  win the  war 
against Japan, and the American public demanded the return of the soldiers home 
(Dobbins et al. , 2003: 4-6).
On  the  humanitarian  situation,  since  economic  activity  in  Germany  was 
severely disrupted, the population did not have the means to support itself. On the 
state apparatus aspect, the Nazi state apparatus had to be dismantled, the perpetrators 
of war crimes had to be punished, and a new system of government had to be created 
(Dobbins et al. , 2003: 5-6).
In  order  to  solve  these  problems,  different  methods  were  adopted  by the 
Allied powers. Until a professional German police was established the order was 
maintained through structures such as the United States Constabulary (USC). This 
was  essentially a  structure  designed to  train  soldiers  in  order  for  them to fulfill 
policing duties (Dobbins et al. , 2003: 9-12).
The  humanitarian  situation  was  solved  through  assistance  programs 
established by the  Allied powers,  and through civilian organizations  such as  the 
International Red Cross (IRC). On the issue of administration, some bureaucrats that 
were in one way or another affiliated with the National Socialist establishment were 
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incorporated in the new state apparatus (Goldstein, 2009:127). Essentially, the Allies 
administrated Germany with the creation of a German new bureaucracy (Dobbins et 
al. , 2003: 13-17).
The end result was a democratic Germany which operated under an open 
market economic system. In the state building literature,  the German example is 
shown as a proof for the transferability of democracy from one country to another.17 
Countries defeated in war need significant amount of capital for the state building 
process to be completed. Also, forcing the perpetrators of past crimes to stand trial 
can be beneficial in the transformation of the country (Dobbins et al. , 2003: 20-21).
2.4.2.2 Japan
The USA's usage of nuclear weapons against Japan ended the war in 1945. 
Unlike Germany, Japan remained  intact after the war ended. Thus, the challenges 
facing the U.S.A. were different in Japan from Germany (Dobbins et al. , 2003: 26-
32). 18  
On the issue of security, Japan still had an army of over 6 million soldiers. It 
was not clear whether all of them would obey the Emperor's wishes to surrender. On 
the humanitarian side,  after  severe allied bombing the Japanese food distribution 
system had been destroyed, thirty percent of the population was left homeless, and 
its shipping capacity was severely depleted.19 On the subject of the administration of 
Japan,  the  state  apparatus,  bureaucracy,  and  the  parliament  remained intact.  The 
17 Germany's  experience with democracy after  World War  One (WWI)  was  a  painful  and short 
experience. 
18 Also in the case of Japan, U.S.A was the only foreign power shaping the state building project.
19 The shipping capacity effected its ability to supply the Japanese mainland with the necessary 
supplies.
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question was should the administration be dismantled or not (Dobbins et al. , 2003: 
26-32).
Since the challenges facing U.S.A. were different, different methods were 
employed  in  the  case  of  Japan's  reconstruction.  On  the  subject  of  humanitarian 
challenges,  unlike Germany,  the Japanese were provided with limited assistance. 
When it came to the issue of administration and the system of government, unlike 
Germany  the  Japanese  Civil  Service  was  kept  and  the  allies  only  assumed 
supervisory roles (Dobbins et al. , 2003: 32-51). 20 
The case of Japan  provides us with different lessons from Germany. First, 
the Japanese case is referred as a case of state-building claiming that democracy was 
transferable to a non-western country.  Second, the local bureaucracy can be very 
useful in the state building process. Third, unilateral action could speed up the state 
building process (Dobbins et al. , 2003: 51-53).
2.4.2.3 Vietnam
Unlike the cases of Germany and Japan,  Republic of Vietnam (RoV) and 
Congo are  often not  presented as  cases  of  "State  Building".  In  fact,  RoV is  not 
mentioned at all.21
The reason why Vietnam can be considered as a  state building project  is 
because,  between 1954-1968 USA implemented economic,  political,  and military 
policies  that  had  far  reaching  effects.  The  projects  included,  but  not  limited  to, 
20 Despite the fact that Japan  also followed an extreme nationalistic ideology, unlike Germany, there 
was not  a National Socialist apparatus to dismantle.
21 The  study  conducted  by   James  Carters,  called  "Inventing  Vietnam"  is  one  most  thorough 
examination of the RoV state building case. In the volume edited by Francis Fukuyama, RoV 
Project is mentioned in passing as "Nation Building Beyond Afghanistan and Iraq". (Ekbladh, 
2006: 27-29).
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creating a political system, administrative system, economic system, and significant 
construction projects22 ( Carter, 2008: 6,44, 79-81, 111-112).
Most studies focus on the American involvement in Vietnam after 1964. By 
this point, due to the failures of the state building activities, the military operations 
were increased. In fact American involvement had started in the early 1950s and 
increased significantly in 1954 with the withdrawal of France. The idea behind the 
American involvement was to establish a viable state in South Vietnam that would 
be able to participate in the international arena. One of the most important civilian 
figures  in  this  process  was  the  Michigan  State  Universities  Advisory  Group 
(MSUG), created in 1955 (Carter, 2008: 15, 20-21, 44,49).
Several  examples  can be given to  support  that  RoV was a  state  building 
effort.  For  example,  to  train  bureaucrats  for  the  new civil  service,  the  National 
Institute of Administration (NIA) was created. Another institution created to aid in 
the new state building project was the National Police Academy (Carter, 2005: 66-
67, 71-76). 
On  the  subject  of  political  system,  RoV  eventually  evolved  into  an 
authoritarian state.  The  RoV leadership,  namely Ngo Dinh Diem had eliminated 
most of the opposition by the use of repressive methods. The authoritarian nature of 
the regime resulted in instability and eventually in its collapse. One reason for this 
instability  was  the  fact  that  ordinary  Vietnamese  in  the  RoV had  lost  hope  of 
expressing themselves. This was due to high rates of arrests by the state officials in 
an arbitrary manner (Carter, 2005: 59, 105-106, 143-149, 177, 232). 
On  the  economic  front,  the  RoV never  gained  strength  to  sustain  itself. 
22 These construction projects included building hospitals, roads, infrastructure etc. ( Carter, 2005: 
6).
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Throughout its existence industrial development and output were very limited, and it 
only managed to survive with the assistance provided by the U.S.A. (Carter, 2005: 
93-105). 
On the humanitarian front, especially after the escalation of conflict through 
military means in  1966,  many rural  RoV citizens  became refugees  in  their  own 
country. This not only added further strain on an already weak infrastructure and 
caused  a  serious  health  hazard,  it  also  further  alienated  the  people  from  the 
government (Carter, 2005: 228-229). 
The RoV experience has important lessons for future state building efforts. 
First, unlike in the cases of Germany and Japan, in the case of RoV, the Americans 
had  decided  to  build  a  new  state  apparatus  and  political  system  from  scratch, 
disregarding any Vietnamese experience of self-government. Second, the Americans 
had allowed the RoV experiment to develop into an authoritarian state. It is very 
difficult  to  create  a  state  without  the  participation  and  contribution  of  the  local 
population.
2.4.2.4 Belgian Congo
Ravaged by the Atlantic slave trade, Congo was made a possession of King 
Leopold II  of  Belgium. Over  the years  Congo became a very lucrative business 
venture for the King. Yet the Congolese people suffered greatly, especially from the 
local constabulary called the Force Public. Due to international condemnation, the 
Belgian parliament removed the colony from the rule of the crown. It was ruled by 
the  parliament  until  1960,  at  which  time  Belgium gave  Congo its  independence 
(Dobbins et al., 2005: 5).
22
After the independence, elected 23 Congolese government asked the Belgian 
administrator staff to remain in Congo and staff the civil servant positions. At 1960, 
Congo did not have enough educated and qualified Congolese to fill the necessary 
bureaucratic  positions  to  run the country.  By 1960,  the  Congolese civil  servants 
consisted of 21,890 individuals. Of these 11,550 were Congolese. Only nine of these 
were  mid  level  bureaucrats.  All  5,900  High  level  bureaucrats  were  European. 
(Dobbins et al., 2005: 5; Didier, 2002: 115).
 One reason for the lack of Congolese administrative staff was the education 
policy of the Belgian government. In Congo, higher education was only introduced 
in  1954  by  the  Belgian  government.  By  June  1960,  only  thirty  Congolese  had 
received university degrees. 
It was at this time that, the old Force Public, the new Congolese rebelled. The 
country was  immediately plunged  into  chaos.  The  Belgian  civil  servants  mostly 
escaped or  were killed by the mutinous  soldiers.  The remaining Congolese civil 
servants  were  inadequate  in  running  the  basic  services.  The  state  apparatus 
collapsed. Soon after the collapse of the state institutions, the economy and social 
order  also  collapsed.  Katanga  region  declared  its  independence  and  the  Belgian 
government, in violation of prior agreements concluded with Congo, sent Belgian 
paratroopers into Congo (Dobbins et al., 2005: 5-7).
After  the involvement  of  Belgium, the Congolese Prime Minister,  Patrice 
Lubumba, asked the UN to assist Congo in restoring order. It is with this request that 
the UN launched its first mission of this kind. This was also the only state building 
23 It is not argued that Congo was a democracy in terms of the modern world. However, the Prime 
Minister, and  national and regional assemblies were elected by the Congolese people. For further 
information consult Didier (Didier, 2002: 112-113).
23
operation that UN conducted during the Cold War (Dobbins et al., 2005: 7).
UN was faced with several challenges in Congo. Security-wise there were 
several issues. First, the UN had to assist the government in removing mercenaries 
from Congo proper.24 Second, the territorial integrity of Congo had to be preserved. 
Third, the objective was the departure of the Belgian troops from Congo. (Dobbins 
et al., 2005: 7-8).
On  the  humanitarian  aspect  of  the  conflict,  with  the  exodus  of  Belgian 
medical staff the already strained medical system collapsed. Even the commercial 
food  distribution  system was  adversely  effected  by the  conflict  (Dobbins  et  al., 
2005: 8).
On the administrative side, the civil service had collapsed. The civil service 
received  its  first  blow with  the  desertion of  the  Belgian senior  staff.25 After  the 
vacuum  created  by  this  desertion,  the  remaining  inexperienced  Congolese  staff 
either managed the necessary services inefficiently or in a corrupt manner. The UN 
was charged with providing assistance to Congolese government to rebuild the civil 
service (Dobbins et al., 2005: 8-9).
On the issue of the political system, there was no consensus internationally 
or internally about Congo's future. The Soviet bloc argued the new system had to 
ensure the removal of Belgium. The Americans claimed the political system had to 
serve the purpose of keeping USSR out of Congo. For the democratically elected 
Congolese government it meant ensuring the territorial integrity of the country in 
24 The  mercenaries,  composed  of   Belgian  army  officers  and  mercenaries  from  other  Western 
nations, were hired by the secessionist Prime Minister of mineral-rich Katanga region.
25 The Belgian staff were responsible for heading the bureaucracy until  the Congolese staff was 
trained.
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order to create a strong Congolese state to keep the old colonial powers out of the 
region.  Finally,  for the break away,  mineral-rich regions,  the new system had to 
ensure their autonomy and the exclusive control over the natural resources (Dobbins 
et al., 2005: 9).
With the use of more than twenty thousand combat troops, and with a half a 
billion dollar  in financing,  the UN operation engaged in a serious state  building 
activity (1960-1964).  On the security front, among other actions, the UN launched 
three major offensives and ended the secessionist movement in Katanga after two 
years of heavy fighting (Dobbins et al., 2005: 13-18).
On  the  issue  of  humanitarian  assistance,  the  World  Health  Organization 
(WHO) under the UN's auspice was not able to cope with the crisis by itself. Thus, 
the  United  Nations  Operations  in  Congo  (ONUC)  received  help  from  over  20 
nations and from the Red Cross. Due to the extra help, ONUC was quite successful 
in not only strengthening the preventative health care services in Congo, but it also 
trained Congolese physicians. ONUC also supplied the Congolese population with 
enough food supplies until the necessary structures for food supply deliveries were 
established again (Dobbins et al., 2005: 18-19).
Administration  wise,  an  entity  named  the  Consultative  Group  (CG)  was 
responsible for assistance to the Congolese government.26 Despite certain failures 
such as putting a stop to corrupt government practices, CG had several successful 
projects. First, it created organizational structures for all the ministries. It supported 
the training of Congolese civil servants at home and abroad. In order the increase the 
pool from which the civil service could acquire new staff, it improved the education 
26 CG was the civilian branch of ONUC. However, it never received the international funding or 
support that was given to the military branch of ONUC (Dobbins et al., 2005: 20).
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system of Congo. ONUC training programs also managed to significantly strengthen 
the central government's administrative capacity.
ONUC  was  least  successful  on  the  issue  of  establishment  of  a  political 
system.27 For example, both General Secretaries of the UN,  Hammarskjöld and U 
Thant, intervened in the political system that seemed to be in favor of geopolitical 
preferences  of  the  Western  Bloc  in  Cold  War  politics.28 Eventually,  the  unstable 
nature of the Congolese politics allowed Colonel Mobutu to create his dictatorial 
regime. 
The Congo example provides  us with several  lessons.  In  a  state  building 
effort,  the  civilian  component  of  the  operation  is  as  important  as  the  military 
component. Second, the unity of the command structure is important for a successful 
operation. Third, state building is a costly activity. Fourth, attempted manipulation 
of the political process to fit the desired geopolitical goals could have adverse effects 
in the future (Dobbins et al., 2005: 25-26).
2.4.3 Why Did State Building Became Important In The 
         Post-Cold War Era?
Contrary to the common belief, state building is not a new phenomenon. As 
discussed in the previous section, it  is has been present for over fifty years. The 
appearance of being a new phenomena is caused by the fact that state building has 
become more important over the years. Why has it become so important?
27 It should be noted that democratization was never a goal of the ONUC (Dobbins et al., 2005: 21).
28 For example, the UN was unable or, by the argument of some, unwilling to protect the elected 
Prime Minister of Congo, Lubumba from getting executed. U.S.A and also Hammarskjold, saw 
Lubumba as ally of the USSR. The  interests of the Congolese was not  a priority  (Dobbins et al., 
2005: 22).
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Just like today, there were states that were far less efficient or successful then 
their counter-parts in the Western world in the post-1945 era. However, the Cold 
War policy had allowed them to survive with the help of either bloc.  Each of these 
states were able to survive with the military or economic aid from either the US or 
the USSR (Robinson, 2007:8).
This foreign support  had allowed them to survive without  developing the 
necessary state institutions to fulfill its responsibilities. The end of the Cold War had 
changed the rules. The artificial stability of weak states that allowed them to survive 
for the duration of the Cold War ended. With the end of this, they began to collapse 
or enter into protracted civil wars (Ferguson, 2003: 2 ; Robinson, 2007: 8).
These  conflicts  began  to  have  regional  and  global  ramifications.  These 
ramifications  had  economic,  social  and  security  components.  Among  the  social 
ramifications one of the most important issues is the subject of refugees.  As the 
neighboring countries began to take in refugees, the protracted nature of the conflict 
created social problems in the refugee camps, and between the refugees and local 
populations. The burden of dealing with these troubles was left to the host country 
(Collier et al. , 2003: 1, 33-51).
The  social  problems  eventually  contributed  to  the  creation  of  economic 
problems.  Not  only  did  instability  cause  a  decrease  in  regional  investment,  the 
neighboring countries were also left with the task of supporting significant number 
of refugees (Collier et al. , 2003: 1, 33-51).
As  the  conflicts  progressed,  security  ramifications  also  become  more 
apparent. With the breakdown of law and order, the conflict zones become the focal 
point of criminal activity. One example to this phenomena was the production and 
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trade of illegal narcotics (Collier et al. , 2003: 1, 33-51). 29 
After the realization of the importance of the state, it had become apparent 
that the failing or failed states could most likely be saved by outside intervention 
(Robinson, 2007: 8). This eventually led to rise of the concept of state building both 
in policy making and academic circles.
2.4.4 Post-Cold War Era30
Unlike the Post-WWII era,  in the Post-Cold War era,  the number of state 
building activities have increased significantly. As previously stated, there were only 
four state  building activities before 1989.31 There have been more then ten state 
building efforts since 1989.
Besides the increase in numbers of state building activities, the number of 
actors which engaged in such activity have also increased. During the Post-WWII 
era there were two major actors. The first major actor was the USA, which engaged 
in three state building efforts. The second major actor was the UN, which engaged in 
one state building effort.32 After  the end of the Cold War,  there have been three 
actors  that  have  engaged  in  state  building.  These  are  USA,  the  UN  ,  and  the 
European powers.
The reason for naming the title after specific actors is not because of the 
29 These are only some examples. There are many more that one can provide.
30 Each case in this section has been chosen because they are endeavors that have the goal to either 
increase or create government capacity to serve its population. Thus each case fits the definition 
provided at the beginning of this chapter.
31 Germany, Japan, Vietnam and Congo, respectively.
32 The U.N. is presented as a major actor in state building, because the Congo operation was one of 
the most significant  events in state building history.
28
nature of these operations. In fact, all state building activity that will be mentioned 
in the coming sections have been multilateral in nature. In the post cold war era, the 
only operation that has some resemblance to unilateralism is the operation in Iraq. 
The sections have been named according to international actors because despite the 
multilateral character each operation had an actor that played a more important role 
in the operation than other nations.
One of the reasons for multilateral nature of the significant majority of state 
building cases can be traced to the hostility towards towards unilateral humanitarian 
intervention (UHI) in general. After the end of WWII, states were prohibited from 
using force in the international arena at all times expect in two specific situations. 
These were in case of self defense and in the case of authorization of the Security 
Council of the UN (UNSC)  (Brown, 2000: 1687-1688; Kritsiotis, 1998: 1008-1009; 
Goodman, 2006: 111).
The hostility towards the legalization of UHI has been present among the 
majority  of  the  UN  members  as  well  as  the  academia  dealing  with  this  issue. 
Furthermore, there is also a legal case which supports this attitude. The International 
Court of Justice (ICJ) has supported skepticism towards UHI in the case Nicaragua 
v.  United  States.  The  main  reason for  the  presence  of  such  a  strong opposition 
against UHI has been the fear that the right to intervene would be abused by major 
powers for their own benefit. (Goodman, 2006: 107-112; Pugwash, 1999; Pugwash 
2001; Brown, 2000: 1727; Goodman, 2006: 113; Kritisiotis, 1998: 1020).
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2.4.4.1 Missions Led By The United States of America33
After the end of the Cold War, there were five USA led operations that had a 
state  building  element  to  it.34 These  were,  Somalia,  Haiti,  Bosnia,  Kosovo,  and 
Afghanistan.35 The  above  mentioned  operations  provided  the  USA  and  the 
international community with several lessons for future operations (Dobbins et al., 
2003: vi-xxix). These lessons are examined according to three factors namely level 
of engagement, the role of regional factors, and the importance of legitimacy. 
2.4.4.1.1 The Level Of Engagement By Intervening Actors
Three  indicators  can  be  used  to  assess  the  level  of  engagement  by  the 
international actors. These are the military and civilian scope36 of the operation, and 
the level of political will put forth by the actors. In order to achieve economic and 
political development, a secure environment is needed which may include a military 
operation.37 There are  several  reasons to this  point.  One of them is  the fact  that 
insecure environments hamper state building efforts by causing the intervening party 
or parties to leave the area. Somalia can be given as an example to this occurrence. 
After the US troops had left Somalia, the U.N. officials did not feel secure enough to 
continue their work. Thus they had to depart. This in part contributed to the further 
33 Unlike the operation in RoV, the post-Cold War missions were coalitions led by the USA. They 
were not unilateral engagements on the part of the USA.
34 Iraq is not among the five operations. 
35 Somalia (1992-1995); Haiti (1993-2000, 2004-?); Bosnia (1995-?); Kosovo (1999-?); Afghanistan 
(2001-?).
36 The civilian scope involves, among others; economic reconstruction and law enforcement.
37 This need is more in line with the SD approach and SF approach. For SDs, security is not desired 
for its own sake but it  is wanted to achieve other goals. For SF, most of the time, security is 
enough as an objective.
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deterioration of the Somalia problem (Dobbins et  al.,  2003: 69, 146; Weinbaum, 
2006:  128-130;  Goodson,2006:  148-153;  Murphy,  2007:  60-63;  Dobbins  et  al., 
2003: 63-64).
The  second  indicator  for  analyzing  the  level  of  engagement  of  the 
intervening actors is the civilian operation. The civilian side of the operation can 
range  from  law  enforcement,  economic  restructuring,  political  development  or 
designing bureaucratic structures. Accordingly, another lesson learned was the fact 
that all state building operations have to be multi-dimensional. (Dobbins et al., 2003: 
69,84,107,126,127; Chesterman, 2005: 154-165).
For example, on the issue of law enforcement, the cases of Bosnia and Haiti 
can  be  used.  In  the  case of  Haiti,  in  order  to  supplement  the  military force,  an 
international police force was deployed. This lifted a heavy burden from the military, 
which was not trained for policing duties. The international police force was later 
augmented by the newly trained Haitian National Police (HNP).  At the beginning, 
the HNP was the most honest and effective component of the Haitian state.  The 
Haitian example also provided the scholars with another lesson in the field of law 
enforcement. It is not enough only to create an effective police force. This must be 
augmented by an equally effective judiciary. Otherwise the system of law eventually 
breaks down (Dobbins et al., 2003: 75-78, 84).
In  the  case  of  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina  (Bosnia)  the  importance  of  law 
enforcement  was  seen  with  the  rise  of  criminal  organizations.  This  hampered 
successful  state  building  efforts.  Moreover,  when  the  international  community 
arrived  in  Bosnia,  there  were  three  police  forces  present  in  Bosnia.  These  were 
Croat,  Bosnian  and  Serbian  police.  This  division  among  ethnic  lines  was  not 
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conducive  for  state  building  purposes.  Unlike  Haiti,  the  international  officers  in 
Bosnia had duties as monitors and trainers. They were not armed. The training of a 
Bosnian police force allowed the international community to decrease the number of 
soldiers on the ground (Dobbins, 2003: 96-97).
Kosovo can be given as an example to the case of economic reconstruction. 
Besides Germany, Kosovo was the only state building project that enjoyed such a 
significant growth in terms of economic activity (Dobbins, 2003: 125). One of the 
most important effects of economic growth is the fact that it decreases the tension 
among the population and allows them to look to the future with hope. This in turn 
contributes positively to the state building project as it encounters less opposition.
The third indicator for measuring the level of engagement, is the notion of 
political will. Political will could effect the outcome of an operation. If it becomes 
apparent that the intervening powers will or cannot commit enough resources to the 
operation,  it  will  most  likely  become a  futile  exercise.  Besides  the  civilian  and 
military resources, an operation requires political will. This was the first lesson of 
post Cold War state building efforts (Dobbins et al., 2003: 69, 84, 107; Edelstein, 
2009: 83-90). 
The first example of this lesson was the events in Somalia. After the losses 
incurred  in  1993,  the  US  administration  decided  to  disengage  from  Somalia. 
Without the assistance of American troops, the UN felt that it could not continue 
with its operations. As such, it too withdrew from Somalia. After the ending of the 
US and the UN efforts, Somalia reverted back to its violent state (Dobbins et al., 
2003: 60-64; Crocker, 1995: 5; Murphy, 2007: 48-63). 
The second example was Haiti. After the serious losses inquired during the 
32
operation  in  Somalia,  the  US  planners  interpreted  the  experience  of  Somalian 
intervention in terms of limiting their engagement in future operations. This led to 
the pre-determined exit-date strategy in Haiti. This approach eventually hampered 
the state building efforts and was counter productive to the entire process (Dobbins 
et al., 2003: 84).
2.4.4.1.2 The Importance Of Legitimacy
Another  factor  in  assessing  the  lessons  learned  is  the  importance  of 
legitimacy. One example for this factor can be given  from Somalia. Somalia is a 
post-colonial  state that  was granted independence in 1960. Thus, when the fliers 
distributed by the US forces depicting an US soldier with a Somalian used the term 
"Slave Nation" instead of "United Nation" because of a mistake in translation, the 
suspicions of the ordinary Somalians grew about the intentions of the international 
community (Dempsey and Fontaine, 2001: 48).    This action had hurt the legitimacy 
of the US led mission in the eyes of the ordinary Somalians.
Furthermore, there is another aspect of legitimacy that have come up in the 
case  of  US  led  intervention  in  Kosovo.  As  stated  earlier,  there  is  considerable 
skepticism towards the UHI among states and scholars. The only organization that is 
viewed to have legitimacy for any Humanitarian Intervention (HI) is the UN. Yet the 
case of Kosovo, according to some scholars,  could be a sign that  the traditional 
negative approach towards UHI could be in a process of change (Goodman, 2006, 
108-112; Brown, 2000: 1684-1687).
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2.4.4.1.3 The Regional Factors
Three indicators are  used to  examine the regional  factors38 in  the lessons 
learned. These are namely the legacy of the country, the extent it is integrated into 
the international scene,  and its  ethnic composition.  Accordingly,  the international 
society has begun to acknowledge the importance of taking into account the history 
of a specific region. As one author has referred, the international community should 
shift  from "cookie  cutter"  approach  to  "strategies  tailored  to  specific  contexts" 
approach (Call and Cousens, 2007: 13).
One example of the lessons learned  under this factor can be given from the 
case of Afghanistan.  In the case of Afghanistan the intervening coalition led by the 
US learned the importance of neighboring countries in state building process. Due to 
the  suitable environment in the region, the intervening forces were able to remove 
Taliban from power. Furthermore, they were able to support the creation of a new 
Afghan government.  If the neighboring countries such as Iran, India,  Russia and 
especially Pakistan did not participate in such an effort, the chances of completing 
the set objectives would have been much harder to achieve  39 (Weinbaum, 2006: 
134; Dobbins, 2003: 138).
Another indicator to assess the lessons learned is the importance of ethnic 
make up of the target region. The importance of this indicator is heightened in cases 
where there is a multi-ethnic society. An example can be given from the Bosnian 
case. Three main ethnic groups live in todays Bosnia. These are the Bosnians, Serbs, 
38 This also includes the domestic factors in a country.
39 Today the situation has reversed. Due to severe instability in Pakistan, the Afghan state building 
project has been adversely affected.
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and Croatians.40 
In the initial stages of the Bosnian intervention it became clear how ethnic 
tensions could undermine the state building effort. Initial structure of the Bosnian 
state had allowed the exclusion of moderates from the political process. Yet the fault 
lines were running much deeper then the overall political system itself. At the level 
of security forces, judicial staff including the judges, who showed severe bias, were 
based on their ethnic identity. The divided nature of the new Bosnian state further 
complicated the situation. Each ethnic group had their own administrative units even 
under  same  Cantons.41 These  administrative  units  had  their  own  health  care, 
education and pension systems (Roeder and Rothchild, 2005: 331-332).
2.4.4.2 Missions Led By The United Nations
With the end of the Cold War, as old problems ended, new problems arose. 
As previously stated one of these problems was the case of weak and failed states. 
These countries were destabilizing the regions they were in. Besides the USA , the 
second major actor which intervened in these countries was the UN.  Since the Cold 
War ended, the UN has intervened in seven countries. These states were Namibia, El 
Salvador, Cambodia, Mozambique, Eastern Slavonia, Sierra Leone and East Timor.42 
(Dobbins,  2005:  v-xxxviii).  Over  the  years  these  operations  have  provided  the 
scholars with different lessons that are assessed through the following factors.
40 Together these groups are referred to as Bosnians.
41 Cantons are the smallest administrative unit in the Federation of Bosnia Herzegovina (FoBH). 
FoBH should not  be confused with  Bosnia Herzegovina (BH),  which consists  of  FoBH and 
Republica Srpska (RS).
42 The date of the operations: Namibia (1989-1990); El Salvador (1991-1995); Cambodia (1991-
1993); Mozambique(1992-1994); Eastern Slavonia-Croatia (1995-1998); Sierra Leone (1998-?); 
East Timor (1999-?).
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2.4.4.2.1  Level Of Engagement By Intervening Actors
In the UN cases one of the important lessons learned was the importance of 
political will, which is an indicator for the level of engagement. For example in the 
case of Cambodia,  the limited mandate  and limited time frame provided limited 
results.43 
In the case of Sierra Leone, the preoccupation of the Western powers with 
Kosovo and the disappointment in Somalia undermined the political will for a long 
term intervention. This contributed to the failure of the first UN mission. Only in 
2000,  when  the  Western  world  was  truly  interested  in  creating  a  peaceful 
environment in Sierra Leone, did the second UN mission succeed (Dobbins, 2003: 
88-89, 147-148).
Another indicator for the level of engagement is the importance of civilian 
scope. Which can be observed in law enforcement. For example, usage of police 
force in El Salvador contributed to the successful continuation of the state building 
process. The deployment of an international police force and the training of a local 
police force was important in establishing law and order, as these allowed the state 
building process to advance more smoothly  (Dobbins, 2005: 64).
2.4.4.2.2 The Importance Of Legitimacy
The  international  environment  in  the  post-Cold  War  era  underlined  the 
importance of legitimacy that is conducive to state building efforts. For example, 
several developments in the international arena allowed the UN to engage in state 
building effort in Namibia.
As the Cold War was nearing to an end, Namibia was under the control of 
43 Although, the Cambodia case can be considered as a success. At the end, it did ensure the creation 
of a democratic government through a democratic election (Dobbins, 2005: 89).
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South Africa (SA). In 1920, the LoN had granted mandate to SA over the territory 
(Namibia). After the dissolution of the LoN and the creation of the UN, the territory 
was supposed to be transferred back to the UN. Despite resolutions of the UN and 
the decisions taken by the ICJ, the SA refused to turn the territory over to the UN 
(Dobbins, 2005: 29, 42-43).
The situation was further complicated by the realities of Cold War politics. 
The  SA had  managed  to  convince  the  USA that  Namibia  was  an  ideological 
battleground between the Western and the Eastern Bloc.44 This and other factors 
allowed the SA to hold on to the territory and kept the UN out of Namibia (Dobbins, 
2005: 29, 42-43).
The end of the Cold War changed this situation. As the ideological battle had 
subsided,  the  international  community  supported  the  UN's  jurisdiction  over 
Namibia.  This international legitimacy allowed the UN to start  its  state building 
process  in  Namibia.  This  was  important  because  it  was  the  first   state  building 
operation  of  the  UN  since  1964.  Furthermore,  it  paved  the  way  for  more 
Humanitarian Intervention  around the globe (Dobbins, 2005: 29, 42-43).
2.4.4.2.3 The Regional Factors
Under this category one of the most important lessons provided by UN led 
operations was the fact that the cooperation of neighbors is an important factor in 
state building efforts. This can be observed in the case of Namibia, Mozambique, 
Eastern Slavonia, and East Timor (Dobbins, 2005: 42,104,123,176).
For example in Eastern Slavonia, the cooperation of Belgrade was important 
44 The presence of Cuban troops in neighboring Angola exacerbated the situation.
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in resolving the conflict peacefully. In another example, the cooperation extended by 
Indonesia was again important in the state building efforts conducted in East Timor 
(Dobbins, 2005: 123,125,176).
2.4.4.3 Missions Led By European States
The third actor in the state building arena was the Europeans. The Europeans 
were  involved  in  six  state  building  efforts.  These  were  Albania,  Sierra  Leone,45 
Macedonia,  Cote D'Ivoire,  Bosnia46 and Democratic  Republic  of Congo (DRC)47 
(Dobbins et al, 2008: v-ix, xv-xxxi).
It should be noted that the operations conducted by the Europeans were much 
more limited in their scope. They were also conducted in cooperation with different 
partners.48 Yet,  due to important contributions by the Europeans,  their  role as an 
intervening actor is examined in a separate section.
2.4.4.3.1  Level Of Engagement By Intervening Actors
European participation in different operations  presented the importance of 
the  level  of  engagement.  One of  the lessons  learned  has  been about  the role  of 
combat units in an operation, which is a component of the security indicator for the 
45 Initially Sierra Leone was a U.N. led operation. However, after the failure of U.N. efforts, the 
operation  was  rescued  by the  United  Kingdom (U.K.).  Besides  security,  U.K.  also  provided 
assistance in restructuring the state bureaucracy (Dobbins et al., 2008: 40-42). This is why Sierra 
Leone is included in both U.N. section and U.K. section.
46 Bosnia was initially a U.S. led operation. The E.U. took over the state building effort in 2004 
(Dobbins et al., 2008: 40-157). 
47 The date and the nature of the operations: Albania (1997); Sierra Leone (2000-?) -  joint operation 
with the UN; Macedonia (2001-?); Cote D'Ivoire(2004-?) - operation conducted jointly with the 
UN; Bosnia(2003-?); Congo (2003) - operation was continued by the UN (2003-?). 
48 In some cases it was the USA, and in some cases it was the UN.
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level of engagement. In state building operations, it has been seen that the support of 
well trained, heavy armed combat units can be important.49 This was the case in the 
DRC operation (Dobbins et al., 2008: 134).
Lessons  regarding  another  indicator,  political  will,  has  also  been  learned 
from  the  cases  of  the  European  interventions.  In  this  case  it  was  about  the 
importance of unity of command.50 Yet, the European case shows that under certain 
circumstances  divided  command  structure  can  be  sustained  without  harming  the 
mission. This is what happened in the Sierra Leone case. In Sierra Leone, the UN 
and the UK structures were separate. However, with close coordination, compatible 
mission objectives, and the limited duration of operation, it was possible to maintain 
separate structures without negatively effecting the outcome (Dobbins et al., 2008: 
25-48).
2.4.4.3.2 The Importance Of Legitimacy
One of the first lessons learned by the international community was 
the importance of legitimacy for a state building effort. Albania was the first state 
building process led by a European country, namely Italy.
Albania issocial and economic conditions steadily deteriorated in the 1990s. 
The  situation  was compounded by the  January 1997 collapse  of  the  widespread 
pyramid schemes in Albania. Following the collapse, due to significant unrest, such 
as rioting and looting, the Albanian state came to the brink of collapse (Dobbins et 
49 This is valid even in cases where there isn't any ongoing inter or intrastate war.
50 The  term  unity  of  command,  despite  having  military  connotation,  can  be   much  more 
comprehensive in nature. In the UN operations it refers to the command structure that administers 
the military and civilian aspect of the operation.
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al., 2008: 7-8, 22-24).
 The  European  countries  initiated  the  Operation  Alba  because  they were 
concerned  that  the  unrest  could  destabilize  the  region.  This  operation  had  the 
backing of a UNSC resolution. The importance of international legitimacy to the 
operation can not be taken lightly. Yet there was a more important legitimacy issue 
that helped for the successful conclusion of the operation. This was the factor of 
domestic  legitimacy.  The European forces  did not  try to  interfere  in  the internal 
politics of Albania and thus did not choose sides. This allowed for the members of 
Operation Alba to work more efficiently (Dobbins et al., 2008: 7-8, 22-24).
2.4.4.3.3  The Regional Factors
 One of the lessons learned was about the importance of history and legacy of 
the  state  subject  to  intervention.  This  is  an  indicator  of  regional  factors.  The 
historical trajectory of state building in a specific region can benefit or hamper state 
building efforts. In the case of Cote D'Ivoire, the historical track and the colonial 
legacy left behind by a European power, namely France, was important. France was 
not only an old colonial power that had controlled the territory in question, but still 
had significant interest and investment there. The presence of French troops in Cote 
D'Ivoire caused uneasiness among the population. Since they were not trusted by the
local  population,  the  UN  and  the  French  efforts  were  significantly  hampered 
(Dobbins et al., 2008: 97-99). 
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2.5 Discussion
As stated earlier there are three mainstream approaches to the issue of state 
building. These are the Security Firsters (SFs), Fast Track Democratizers (FTDs, and 
Slow Democratizers (SDs).  In this section, the arguments of these approaches are 
investigated in the light of three factors, (the level of engagement, regional factors 
and  legitimacy)  which  were demonstrated  as  important  in  various  state  building 
efforts taken by the USA, the UN and the European countries.51
The  source  of  the  difference  among  the  mainstream approaches  of  state 
building are assumptions about human nature. The FTDs assume that all populations 
desire to create and live in a democratic state structure. Thus, the proponents of FTD 
argue that democracy can be rapidly transferred to any society.  
Thus,  in  regards  of  level  of  engagement,  the  FTDs  focus  their  attention 
primarily on the indicators of political will and military scope. This was the case 
during the UN operation in the Belgian Congo in the 1960s. There was a significant 
amount of political will behind the operation. This can be seen from the fact that 
despite the losses incurred by the UN troops, the international community kept the 
troops in the Belgian Congo until it reached a somewhat satisfactory conclusion. The 
troop presence and defeat of the non-governmental forces also show the importance 
attached to the military scope portion of the operation. Yet the limited nature of the 
economic and political scope of the operation eventually led to the establishment of 
an undemocratic system. This in turn caused regional instability in the 1990s and 
gave  rise  to  the  deployment  of  another  state  building  operation  in  the  Belgian 
Congo.
51 The table at the end of the section could be consulted for a summary of the arguments presented 
in the discussion. 
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The FTDs do not consider regional factors to be an issue at the forefront of 
the  operational  agenda.  The  FTDs  argument  that  democracy  can  be  readily 
transferred to any society plays an important role in this assumption. The case of 
Cote D'Ivoire on the other hand does show detrimental affects of such an neglect. 
The presence of French troops in the European-led state building effort harmed the 
operation. This was due to the colonial history of Cote D'Ivoire.
The  FTDs also  do  not  attach  the  necessary importance  to  the  legitimacy 
factor because they assume that the population in question already desires to live in 
a democratic state. Thus, in the minds of the FTDs legitimacy is already a factor 
present. Yet the case of Somalia shows that this might not be true in every case. In 
Somalia, when faced with the choice of choosing between foreign interventionist 
actors and the clan, the Somalians chose the clan. 
The SF approach attaches importance to the military scope under the level of 
engagement factor. After the end of Cold War, the state building process in some 
poor developing countries resulted in failures. One of the earliest failures was the 
case  of  Somalia.  The  lack  of  security  had  played  an  important  role  in  the 
unsatisfactory  result  of  the  operation.  The  Sierra  Leone  case  was  an  important 
turning point. It showed the importance of security. Furthermore, the interventionist 
parties  began to understand that certain situations required the presence of well 
armed troops. Otherwise the other aspects of the operation, such as the social aspects 
would collapse.
According to  the SFs approach the regional  factors  are  considered,  albeit 
only in a limited scope, namely from the security scope. The USA led operation in 
Afghanistan  initially  achieved  a  satisfactory  result  because  of  the  military 
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cooperation extended by its neighbors. Yet the cooperation with the neighbors of 
Afghanistan was limited to security issues. For example, the economic cooperation 
was not considered under the regional factors.
Legitimacy,  for  the  SFs  has  a  low  priority.  In  the  case  of  the  RoV,  the 
intervening  power  focused exclusively on  the  matter  of  security.  This  and other 
actions  disillusioned  the  local  population  from  the  political  process  of  RoV. 
Eventually the legitimacy of the state building operation was adversely affected by 
these developments.  The result was total collapse of the state building process.
The third approach, the SDs focus on the political will and economic scope 
under the level of engagement factor. In the Kosovo case the intervention parties 
have  observed  the  benefits  of  unity  of  command.  This  issue  as  an  indicator  of 
political will, contributed to the success of the Kosovo operation. Also the Kosovo 
case  presents the importance of civilian scope in state building process.  Due to 
proper planning and expending of the necessary resources, the economic activity 
was restored in Kosovo. The economic growth in turn contributed to the stabilization 
of the region and thus benefited the state building process. 
Regional factors are considered by the SDs during state building process. 
During the East Slavonia case the extensive cooperation with the neighbors was 
important in the stabilization of the region. Also, in the case of Bosnia it was noted 
that if the neighbors are pulling a nation apart, the state building process becomes 
more diffusible.
The SDs put slightly more emphasis on the issue of legitimacy.52 In the case 
of  Namibia,  the  UN  ensured  the  presence  of  international,  regional  and  local 
52 It is slightly more because every intervention has its opposition. Thus it is very difficult to achieve 
a high level legitimacy.
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legitimacy. This allowed the successful completion of the first state building effort 
since the end of Cold War. Thus, it was instrumental in ushering a new era of state 
building activities.
Until now, the most successful approach seems to be the SD approach. It has 
most success rate in the examples provided in the previous sections. The cases of 
Kosovo, Bosnia, East Slavonia and Namibia are some of the examples. However, 
some aspects of SD approach could be supplemented with the state contingencies of 
the given state subject to intervention. One of these contingencies is the historical 
trajectory of state building in the intervened state. Another contingency is the ethnic 
composition of a society. The relationships among different ethnic groups can be 
detrimental to the state building effort. Furthermore, the importance of legitimacy is 
not thoroughly mentioned in the SD argument.53 For a successful completion of state 
building process local and international legitimacy seems to be the most important 
factor among all cases by all major intervening actors.
53 Legitimacy is more important to the SD approach then the SF and FTD approach. Yet it does 
deserve significantly more attention then the SDs attribute to it.
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CHAPTER III 
THE HISTORY OF STATE BUILDING IN IRAQ
As it was stated in the previous chapter,  the level of engagement, regional 
factors and  legitimacy are important factors in state building process. Moreover, the 
history of Iraq is pertinent to the current state building process in Iraq, because it had 
experienced  similar  state  building  process  throughout  its  history.54 Thus,  the 
historical trajectory of the state building process and its related contingent factors, 
can provide the scholars of today with important lessons.
This chapter is divided into five sections. The first four sections represent the 
historical periods in which significant amount of power among external and local 
actors has changed. The fifth section discusses findings in previous sections.
3.1 The British Mandate Period (1920-1932)
The British military advance towards the Ottoman Empire in the Middle East 
was initially to ensure the security of its colonial interests in India. Yet, as the British 
forces were advancing, a significant bureaucratic mechanism was being built in the 
occupied territories. Although it was not explicitly stated, it seemed that the British
54 Albeit an unsuccessful state building process.
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 government would officially occupy the territories even after the conclusion of the 
armistice. This ran contradictory to the stated prior objectives about the status of 
these provinces at the end of the war. It had been argued that the occupied land 
would be returned to the Ottoman Empire. The words of Major Sir Habort Young, 
who was part of the Expeditionary Force at Basra clearly shows  the attitude even 
among the British ranks at the time. He  argued that: " In those early days I naturally 
assumed, with everyone else out there, that Mesopotamia would be annexed to the 
British Empire, the only doubt being whether it would come under India or not..." 
(Dodge, 2007: 10). 
However, even after the end of the war UK remained in the Middle East, and 
occupied the three provinces (vilayet) of the Ottoman Empire. These were Basra, 
Baghdad, and Musul. As the war was coming to an end, the initial desire in 1917 
was that Basra province would be part of the British Empire, and the rest would 
compose of a new state backed by the British (Tripp, 2007: 30-38; Dodge, 2003: 10-
11).
In order to achieve its goals, one of the initial concerns of the British Empire 
was to build its occupation on legitimate ground, both internationally and internally 
in  Basra,  Baghdad, and Musul.  The question of legitimacy in the context of the 
international system was solved through the League of Nations (LoN). In 1920, at 
the San Remo conference, the UK was given a mandate by the LoN for the purposes 
of  creating a  new state  that  would  be able  to  take  its  place in  the international 
system.  Despite  the  British  attempt  to  annex  Basra,  one  important  unintended 
consequence of the LoN mandate  and its  subsequent  oversight  was that  the UK 
could not annex the Basra province (Ismail, 2008: 10; Dodge, 2003: 1; Tripp, 2007: 
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30,41).
During  the war,  British did not  encounter  any serious  opposition  in  their 
advance from the local non-Turkish community. The local elements either joined the 
invasion forces, or stayed neutral and waited for the events to unfold. This, however, 
was not the case after the war. The local local population did not trust the British 
intentions.  Furthermore,  the  concept  of  Mandate  was  rejected  by  a  significant 
portion  of  the  population.  The  population  of  the  three  provinces  felt  they  were 
becoming  a  colony  of  the  British  Empire   (Ismail,  2008:  10;  Dodge,  2003:  1; 
Tripp,2007: 30, 32, 40).
Due  to  the  above  mentioned  dissatisfaction  among  the  local  population, 
resistance had already started by 1918. Two examples can be given from northern 
and the central Iraq. In the north the resistance was formed around Sheikh Mahmud 
Barzinji, and in the center an organization named  Jam'iyye al-Nahda al-Islamiyya55 
was established in Najaf. However, all instances of resistance were eliminated by the 
British troops (Tripp,2007: 33).
By 1920 the local resistance had grown to mass protests, which was mainly 
organized by the middle class. These protests were repressed by the British through 
the use of force. This in turn led to the creation of a full blown armed rebellion 
(Ismail, 2008: 11; Dodge, 2003: 8; Tripp, 2007: 39).
The increased opposition to the British presence had emphasized the lack of 
legitimacy of the British presence. As it is the case today, the lack of legitimacy 
hampers state building efforts . In the 1920s, this was the case in Iraq.
Given the challenge of legitimacy for the British presence in Iraq,  a new 
55 The Society of Islamic Revival.
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cover was needed. This came in the form of Anglo-Iraq Treaty of 1922. Despite the 
criticisms that had emanated from in the domestic groups, the Constituent Assembly 
of Iraq voted in favor of the adoption of the treaty in 1924. The  British threat of 
using force did play a part in the acceptance of the treaty. The treaty formalized the 
British presence in Iraq for a period of twenty years (Ismail, 2008: 11; Tripp, 2007: 
51, 56).
Nevertheless, the suspicions of the local population continued, which British 
themselves accepted in the report prepared by His Britannic Majesty's Government 
(His  Majesty's  Stationery Office,  1925:  5).   Although the  British positions  were 
relegated to the adviser status, it was British officers who were truly in charge. The 
treaty contained articles that could have been interpreted as confirming the fears of 
the Iraqis. One such article stipulated that “...the (Iraqi) King would heed Britain's 
advice on all matters affecting British interest...” (Ismail, 2008: 11; Dodge, 2003: 9; 
Tripp, 2007: 40). Thus, there has been no genuine support of the local people in state 
building efforts due to lack of legitimacy.
Furthermore,  the  state  building  efforts  have  been  a  total  disregard  of  the 
historical (Ottoman) legacy of the three provinces. The view of the British officials 
at  the  former  Ottoman  provinces  perceived  the  region  from  an  Orientalist 
perspective. Accordingly, the Ottoman system was a brutal and corrupt system that 
was not worthy of continuation.56 Thus, the state building process had to start from 
scratch (Dodge, 2003: 43-44, 48-51).
The attempt of the British to change the societal structure of the provinces 
56 It was not worthy of continuation because it was argued that the system was unreformable. This 
view is not totally in sync with the historical reality of the three provinces during the time of the 
Ottoman Empire (Cetinsaya,2006: 147-152).
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can be given as  an example for  the influence of the orientalist  perspective.  The 
British officials had not studied the Ottoman period, and the local population itself. 
As such, on top of disregarding the Ottoman legacy, they disregarded the legacy of 
the Islamic civilization on the local population.(Dodge, 2003: 64,74-76).
Instead  they  tried  to  understand  the  population  in  terms  of  Western 
experience of state building efforts. Thus, the Lockean perspective was the dominant 
one. Just like the FTDs, the British officials believed that the population desired a 
democratic, civilized rule. The British believed that this was in their nature. In the 
case of the provinces,  the British argued that  the tribe was the most  democratic 
formation. Because the tribal leader had to listen to its subjects. On the other hand 
the state was foreign, despotic, and armed with weapons.  The perception of the 
British can be seen from the following statement. In the Annual Report for the Basra 
Division of 1918, it  was stated that  “...These landlords are men of gentility and 
pride, occupying a position of influence and status reminiscent of that of the feudal 
landlords  in  English  history...”  (Oriental  and  India  Office  Records,  1918:  240; 
Dodge, 2003: 46,64,74-76,124-125).
With these kind of ideas in mind, the new Iraqi society was built around the 
Lockean  premise.  This  also  created  a  new  structure  of  state-society  relations. 
Accordingly, the rural population was organized under the strongest regional sheik. 
And the groups that did not fit the British tribal system were either overlooked or 
incorporated into the new system in a violent manner. One of the consequences of 
this system was that some elements of the society that did not fit  into this tribal 
system could not even benefit from government programs. (Dodge, 2003: 46, 76, 
84).
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Prior to the invasion of the British, Iraq's rural societal structure was much 
more  diverse  in  nature.57 There  were  many different  small  and  large  formations 
However,  the  new rural  structure  of  Iraq  had  become much  more  compact  and 
hierarchical (Dodge, 2003: 81, 84,128,129, Tripp, 2007: 30).
Furthermore, in the future, the strengthening of tribal affiliations would cause 
problems to the unity of Iraq on different levels. One institution which the negative 
effects of such policies were seen was the Iraqi Army.  To unite the peoples of the 
country, one solution that was put forth was the commencement of conscription.58 It 
was argued that, conscription would allow individuals from different backgrounds to 
develop loyalty to the newly established state. Tribal leaders were opposed this idea, 
since as this process was uniting the country it would weaken their status in it. Due 
to the backing of the British, the idea had to be shelved for the time being ( Al-
Marashi and Salama, 2008: 22-25). It could be argued that this delay caused by the 
British  officials  harmed  the  creation  of  an  efficient  army that  would  be  able  to 
protect the unity of the newly developing state. Furthermore, it also hampered the 
efforts of developing a national identity that was in concert with the development of 
a new state.
Another factor important to examine in state building process is the level of 
engagement by the intervening actor. There was a high level of engagement on the 
part  of  the  British  towards  the  three  provinces.  One  indicator  of  the  level  of 
engagement is the civilian scope of the operation. Accordingly, two examples can be 
57 This diverse structure presented itself in the form of economic, cultural or religious differences 
(Dodge, 2003: 92).
58 This was an important reason for the need of conscription, however it was not the only one (Al-
Marashi and Salama,2008: 22-25).
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given that resulted in divisions in the reconstructed Iraqi society. The first one was 
the electoral  system. Due to the electoral  system that was designed to favor the 
sheiks, 34 out 99 deputies of the first Iraqi parliament were sheiks or agas. While, 
the  sheik  was  seen  as  an  honorable  individual,  the  urban  representative   was 
perceived as an irrational and violent lawyer/politician. This was one reason why the 
British favored the sheiks in the parliament (Dodge, 2003: 90-92).
The  second  example  is  the  judicial  system  of  the  new  state.  The  legal 
regulations that were implemented as early as 1918 changed little in character during 
the British Mandate period. According to this, the towns (cities) were subject to civil 
law that was based on the Ottoman law. This law was  progressive and was able to 
adopt to changing times and situations. Yet this was not the case in the rural areas. In 
accordance with the British vision of how the Iraqi society was constructed, the rural 
areas came under the jurisdiction of a different code of law (Dodge, 2003: 92-100).
This was called Tribal Criminal and Civil Disputes Regulations (TCCDR). 
TCDDR was established and executed according to the Orientalist perspective that 
effected British officials in charge of the state building efforts. TCDDR was almost 
completely taken from the British colonial code of the Indian North West Frontier. 
The TCDDR was a major force reshaping the rural societal structure (Dodge, 2003: 
92-100; Fattah,2003: 54).
This dual system of law contributed to the division in Iraqi society; namely 
the division between the rural and the urban societies, which eventually hampered 
the state building efforts. 
Another  indicator  of  the  level  of  engagement  of  the  UK  in  the  three 
provinces was the political will. It effects  the duration and the effort put in, and the 
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available  resources  for  the  state  building  process.  While  Britain  had  solved  the 
legitimacy problem only at the platform of LoN, which was not representative of all 
international  community,  the  international  environment  at  the  time  was  not 
supportive of state building activities of the UK. The WWI had caused not only 
political  turmoil in the world but also an economic one. The new world order had 
weakened Britain both economically and politically. This in turn caused a steady 
decline of the British public support and the political will to commit resources in 
places such as Iraq. Consequently, the goals of the UK had changed overtime in Iraq. 
It  became clear that  Basra could not be annexed by the UK during the mandate 
period (Dodge, 2003: 2-4, 37,38,40,132; Ismael, 2008: 13 ).
However, by 1927 the internal politics of Britain, the factors in the domestic 
realm of the three provinces59,  and the post-WWI international environment  had 
made the UK to give up the state building they envisioned for Iraq.  In order to 
continue the engagement in the three provinces, the British officials even had make 
such statement as “... Iraq affords a splendid training ground for the Royal Air Force. 
Baghdad, so far as one can foresee, is likely to always be a pivotal point in our air 
communications with the East. In our own interests, quite apart from those of Iraq, 
we cannot  afford to  scrap  the  admirably efficient  organization  that  has  been  set 
up....” (Dodge,2003: 9, 35, 40).
After 1927, the goal had been to create an authoritarian state that could limp 
on its own. This would allow not for a liberal state but a state that could provide 
social  order.   The  end  result  would  be  a  “...  quasi-state,  one  which  bore  the 
59 These domestic factors did not only consist of mistakes made by the British government. The 
local population and elite also resisted the British attempts. Due to their suspicion of the British 
intent, they did everything in their power to gain independence as early as possible. Whether they 
were ready or not  had not played a role in their calculations (Dodge,2003: 158).
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appearance of a de jure national polity but whose institutions were in fact a facade 
built  in  order  to  allow  Britain  to  disengage...”  (Dodge,2003:  10,37,39  96; 
Tripp,2007:  30).  In  fact,  in  1931  the  British  High  Commissioner,  Sir  Francis 
Humphrys,  in  front  of  the  Permanents  Mandate  Commission  (PMC), argued 
(Dobbes,2003: 40) that there were two types of state: 
the “civilized nations of the modern world,” and those like Iraq, where 
“the machinery of government . . . may not run quite so smoothly or so 
efficiently as in some more advanced and more highly developed State.” 
A comparison  between  these  two  types  of  state  was  neither  fair  nor 
necessary.  Both had the right to exist  as independent states within the 
international  community.  Iraq,  therefore,  “given  the  support  and 
inspiration of membership of the League, is now fit to stand alone; it is 
now capable of self-government,  indeed for all practical purposes it  is 
already governing itself. 
Thus,  Iraq  declared  its  independence  in  1932.  The  three  provinces  had 
formally turned into a separate state; namely Iraq. Oil was not at the forefront of the 
rhetoric, during the early state building process between 1918 and 1932. The public 
goal was the protection of the India route and elimination of the Ottoman threat. 
Even though it was more subtle, the oil factor was always present and it was one of 
the principles that guided the British actions in the three provinces. The protection of 
the Abadan Oil refinery and similarly, the eventual push towards Musul at the end of 
the war should be considered in the light of this fact  (Mejcher, 1976: 1-21, 149-159, 
165-168).60
The Turkish Petroleum Company (TPC) was responsible for the search of oil 
deposits in Iraq. Prior to the beginning of the First World War, the company was a 
joint venture between the Germans, the British and an Armenian by the name of 
60 Oil deposits were not found in Musul until 1927. It can be extrapolated that the reason for this 
could be the resolution of the Musul question between Britain and Turkey that was solved only in 
1926. The production had started in late  1930s and production in  industrial  quantity had not 
started  until the 1950s (Mejcher, 1976: 1-21, 149-159, 165-168).
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Calouste Gulbenkiyan. After the end of the war, the French took the position of the 
Germans in the company (Ulugbay, 2003: 215-231, 271,510-512). Eventually, the 
TPC was turned into the Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC). The only change was the 
joining of the Americans to the venture (Marcell, 2006: 17-18).
The new company would set the rules for the oil sector throughout the former 
Ottoman territory. Another significance of the creation of the new company was the 
fact  that   it  was  stipulated  that  petroleum  companies  would  not  compete  for 
concessions  elsewhere  in  the  former  Ottoman  Empire  territory.  This  agreement, 
known as the “red line agreement”61 was brokered by Gulbenkiyan. By the 1930s 
IPC was defining the structure of oil industry, and became the cartel regarding oil in 
the former Ottoman territories in the Middle East (Marcell,2006: 17-18).
The importance  attached to oil can be seen from the fact that despite short 
comings  in  the  state  building  process,  the  operations  in the  oil  sector  were  not 
effected; not even from the violence caused by the armed rebellions by the local 
population. In fact, the main reason for the late development of the oil deposits was 
more about politics, since the reports prepared  between 1925-1932   by the British 
government for the Council of the League of Nations on the administration of Iraq 
demonstrates the politics of oil in Iraq (Mejcher, 1976: 165-168). The sections of the 
reports  dealing  with  the  oil  sector, do not  show any problems regarding  the  oil 
sector, the exception being for the political negotiations (Majesty's Stationery Office, 
1925-1932).
Besides being an important reason for the British state building efforts in the 
former Ottoman provinces of Basra, Baghdad, and Musul; oil would also come to 
61 Kuwait was excluded from this arrangement.
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effect  the  future  of  Iraq.  For  example,  there  were  reservations  even  among  the 
British Military staff about the soundness of incorporating Musul into the new state. 
Some  argued  that  Musul  could  destabilize  the  new  state  for  various  reasons. 
However, at the end Musul was integrated into Iraq in order to protect the British 
energy interests. Thus, the challenges of oil wealth and  multiethnic structure of the 
Iraqi society had been set into the Iraqi political process.
3.2 The Hashemite Monarchy Period (1932-1958)
 The British mandate period had set up a state that was marred with different 
problems in different fronts. Despite these troubles, Iraq was granted independence. 
One reason was the fact that Iraqi state was able to exert some type of control over 
its population. The second reason was the fact that the British oil interest had been 
guaranteed by this point in time (Samira, 1997: 82). 
 From the end of the Mandate Period in 1932 until the invasion by the US in 
2003,  the  main  factors  that  have  defined  Iraq's  state  building  process  could  be 
determined as oil, identity, and the army. Oil has played a role in Iraq from the time 
it was invaded by the British. British role exacerbated the issue of identity during the 
Mandate period by supporting and also changing the tribal structure of the three 
provinces.  The  army factor  became important  especially  after  it  was  politicized, 
starting with the 1936 coup.
 The importance of  identity presented itself throughout the Iraqi state even 
from the start of its independence. By 1935, the Iraqi Shi'ites in the south and the 
Iraqi Kurdish tribes in the north were dissatisfied. The Iraqi Shi'ites believed that the 
newly  created  state  was  turning  into  a  Sunni  state.  Certain  events  caused  their 
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suspicions to increase. One of these events was the alienation of a politician, Ja'far 
Abu al-Timman. Unlike other politicians he had a diverse following  and was able to 
cut across the social divisions in Iraq. The Shiites felt that the negative treatment he 
received in the political system was due to his Shiite connections. This reinforced 
the feeling that Iraq was a Sunni dominated state (Tripp,2007: 77-80).
 A second event in 1933 that increased discontent among the Shiite population 
was because of the Gharraf dam project and the resignation of two Shiite ministers. 
In 1933 King Faisal, who was brought by the British as the Iraqi head of state, died. 
His son King Ghazi took his place.  King Ghazi's actions increased the resentment of 
the Shiite population. One such action was the diversion of funds from the Gharraf 
dam. If the dam had been built as planned, it would have primarily benefited the 
Shiite  population  of  Iraq.  This  was  seen  as   another  act  of  a  Sunni  dominated 
government.  The  resignation  of  two  Shiite  ministers  in  response  increased  the 
tension. Eventually this tension led to the Shiite uprising of 1935.  In 1935, almost 
half of the Iraqi army was stationed in the south to quell the Shiite rebellion. The 
other  half  was stationed in  the north.  By 1935 the Iraqi  Kurds in the north had 
rebelled  as  well.  They  felt  that  WWI  promises  of  autonomy and  perhaps  even 
independence  was not  kept  (Tripp,2007:  77-80;  Al-Marashi  and Sammy Salama, 
2008: 33-34; Ghareeb, 2003: 170).
 In  1935,  this  division  of  the  country  was  tried  to  be  rectified  with  the 
introduction of conscription.62 The argument was that as every person, regardless of 
their cultural background, was to serve in the military, this would create and also 
reinforce the new Iraqi identity. The project was not a success. It only allowed the 
62 Conscription was introduced with the passing of the National Defense Law, (NDL) also referred 
as the National Service Law (NSL) (Al-Marashi and Sammy Salama, 2008: 33).
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societal divisions, which were exacerbated during the Mandate period, to enter the 
lower ranks of the army (Tripp,2007: 77-80; Al-Marashi and Sammy Salama, 2008: 
33-34; Ghareeb, 2003: 170). 63 
 The Iraqi Army was a mirror of the Iraqi society. It was divided  along ethnic, 
tribal, sectarian and ideological64 lines. Most of the officer corps was dominated by 
the  Sunni  Arabs,65 which  were  resented  by  other  societal  groups.  Due  to  this 
imbalance at  the officer level,  the soldiers were also divided along societal  fault 
lines. This could be clearly seen in the 1935 uprising, where many soldiers did not 
fight against their tribe. In fact, during the fight some soldiers joined the side of their 
tribe. The British report commissioned in 1935 about the army also states this point: 
“Many  of  the  officers  are  believed  to  be  in  sympathy  with  the  Government’s 
opponents, and the majority of the rank and file, being Shi'ite . . . some few officers 
actually refused to proceed to the front...”  (Al-Marashi and Sammy Salama, 2008: 
34, 37-41; Ismael, 2008: 25).
 By 1936, some Army officers believed that Iraq could not progress with these 
type of policies. Thus, the army entered into politics in 1936 with a coup d'etat. 
Major reasons for the 1936 coup were the discontent among the population (1935 
rebellion) and the British involvement seeking its oil interest through Iraqi politics.66 
The army entered into the political  power struggle,  but it  was still  divided.  This 
63 Another reason for the failure of the conscription program was because of its late introduction. 
This was due to the British opposition to the idea ( Al-Marashi and Salama, 2008: 33-35). If it had 
been introduced earlier, before the cultural divisions were exacerbated, the program might have 
had a positive effect.
64 There were several ideologies that divided the society. Two important ones were Pan-Arabism and 
Communism (Al-Marashi and Sammy Salama, 2008: 37-41, Ismael, 2008: 25) .
65 The Iraqi state did not take any significant action to rectify this imbalance.
66 Iraq was granted independence in 1932. However,  the Anglo-Iraqi treaty allowed the British to 
still influence  Iraqi politics.
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division is reflected in the different factions of the army which have initiated several 
coups from 1936 until 1958 (Al-Marashi and Salama, 2008: 46-49; Tripp, 2007: 86-
96).67 Thus oil was a  fundamental question both for distribution of wealth so that to 
satisfy  discontent  among  different  social  groups  and  for  British  involvement  to 
secure access to oil resources in Iraq. 
 The rising civil discontent was closely related to sharing of the oil wealth. 
This eventually led to the 1958 coup, which would fundamentally change Iraq. Oil 
wealth was critical for economic development of Iraq. The agricultural68 sector was 
inefficient and because of this more labor was needed in the agricultural sector. This 
in turn did not leave enough work force for the other sectors. This was important 
because unlike other developing nations, Iraq was under populated,  which restricted 
the  labor  market.  The  income  level  of  the  majority  of  population  was  another 
challenge for economic development. Since the land was in the hands of the few 
tribal leaders, the income level of the agricultural workers was low. Even if there 
was  an  industry,  the  population  did  not  have  the  necessary  capital  to  buy  the 
products it produced. (Samira, 1997: 55; Alnasrawi, 1994: 24).
 Within  this  framework,  oil  was  crucial  for  bringing  prosperity  to  the 
dissatisfied social groups. The oil sector was not in need of capital, because the West 
was making massive investments through the IPC and its subsidiaries. However, the 
oil  wealth  and  the  investments  did  not  benefit  the  ordinary  Iraqi.  Most  of  the 
workers  in  the  oil  sector  were  foreigners,  and  the  needed  labor  force  for  oil 
67 The coups prior to 1958 and the 1958 coup had different characters. The Army did not rule the 
country in the coups prior to 1958. However; the 1958 coup brought with it the direct rule of the 
Army (Al-Marashi and Sammy Salama, 2008: 77).
68 The importance of agriculture will reveal itself in the coming paragraphs.
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production was small anyway. Thus, job creation for the Iraqis were low. Moreover, 
since most of the machinery was imported from the West, which in turn impeded the 
development of domestic industry (Samira, 1997: 55,70).
 By the 1950s, the Iraqis demanded for a change in their welfare and  sharing 
the oil wealth. The 1952 petroleum deal between the Iraqi government and the IPC 
had raised the hopes of Iraq.69 Up to 1952, the royalties that came from petroleum 
deal were limited. This changed with the 1952 petroleum deal. The revenue of the 
Iraqi government had increased significantly (Samira, 1997: 55,70,71). However, the 
increases in government revenues did not benefit the Iraqi people, and it also harmed 
the state building process by paving the way for an authoritarian and distributive 
(rentier) state structure.
 In  Iraq  the  Development  Board  (DB)  was  responsible  for  using  the  oil 
revenues in social programs. Yet, as the oil revenues increased in the 1950s, the first 
act of the government was to decrease the independence of this body. Furthermore, 
the new appointments politicized the body. The funds provided by the DB benefited 
mostly the already well-off tribal leaders/landowners. The DB also did not allocate 
enough funds to the agricultural sector, where most of the labor force was employed 
(Samira, 1997: 38,55,70,71,72-74,80; Alnasrawi, 1994: 24-34).  
 Besides  not  benefiting  the  Iraqi  people,  it  also harmed the  state  building 
efforts. One way it harmed the state building effort was by further alienating the 
Iraqi state from the people. Especially from 1950 and onwards, the source of the 
revenue for the Iraqi state had changed.  Taxes were not the main source of revenue 
for the state anymore, it was oil. This isolated the Iraqi state. Since the state was not 
69 This deal was made possible due to the actions of Mossadaq in neighboring Iran (Samira,1997: 
71-72).
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dependent  on  its  people,  it  increasingly  ignored  their  demands.  (Samira,  1997: 
38,55,70,71,72-74,80) The focus shifted from state building to maintaining the status 
quo  and  the  power  of  the  state  elite.  Furthermore,  the  increased  social  unrest 
eventually caused the 1958 coup. The importance of the 1958 coup was the fact that 
this time the Iraqi Army assumed the power of government directly. Consequently, 
the coup hindered the development of a civilian democratic Iraqi state.
3.3 The Republic (1958-1968)
 Prior to the 1958 coup, there was an unwritten agreement among the elites of 
Iraq. This tripartite alliance was between the tribal leaders including landowners, the 
King and the political class. This domestic alliance was supported by an imperial 
power, the UK. The involvement of the UK had been through the use of the military 
bases  in  Iraq,  treaty  alliances,  oil  interests,  and  civil  and  military  advisers 
(Alnasrawi,2002: 52). 
 The 1958 coup changed the nature of the regime. The public had expected the 
army would assume a moderator role. The civilians would still be in charge. This did 
not happen. The military machinery, dismissed many civilians and the rest refused to 
work for a military government. Among other problems this caused for the rise of 
unqualified individuals in the bureaucracy. The transition period had served the coup 
leaders  goal  of  consolidating  their  newly  established  regime  (Al-Marashi  and 
Salama, 2008: 77-79). 
 The leader  of  the coup was Brigadier  General  Abdul  Karim Qassim.  His 
actions  had  started  a  new tradition  in  Iraq  in  which  one  individual  would yield 
excessive power. This tradition would eventually bring Saddam Hussein into power. 
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Besides the nature of the regime, not much changed in Iraq. The Iraqi society and 
consequently the armed forces were still divided. For example, the officers who took 
part in the coup did not represent a monolithic group.70 This caused the tradition of 
coups to continue throughout the Republic period of the Iraqi history.  (Al-Marashi 
and Sammy Salama, 2008: 82-88). 
 The discipline of the Iraqi Armed Forces (IAF) was further deteriorating. The 
main factor in this occurrence was the entrenched tradition of coup attempts. The 
1958  coup  further  deteriorated  the  situation  by  removing  the  last  elements  of 
somewhat a democratic regime in Iraq.71 For the Iraqis, the only measure available 
for a government change became the instrument of coup. Thus, the most important 
legacy of the 1958 coup was that it further destabilized the country and the armed 
forces (Al-Marashi and Salama, 2008: 78-109; Tripp, 2007: 143-178).
 The most important coup during the Republic period was the February 1963 
coup. It was executed in conjunction with Colonel Abdul Rahman Arif supporters 
and the Arab Socialist Ba'ath Party (Ba'ath) members.72 The coup was successful 
because of  General  Qassim's  policies.  Since  no significant  reform initiative  was 
taken, he had lost many of his supporters. By November 1963, Arif had managed to 
remove the Ba'ath officials from power. Hence the tradition of strong man rule was
70 One important divide that was present among the officers was about how to shape the future of 
Iraq, whether by pursuing  Pan-Arabism or another approach (Marashi and Salama,2008: 82-84; 
Tripp, 2007: 148).
71 Besides  Ba'ath,  the Iraqi  Communist  Party (ICP) was  the  only other  well  organized  political 
entity. Yet with the 1963 coup, they were mostly wiped out by the Iraqi leadership (Ismael,2008: 
106-114).
72 Colonel  Arif was one of the most  important  individuals in 1958 coup. His powers were later 
stripped by General Qassim.
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continued under  the rule  of  Colonel  Arif  (Al-Marashi  and Salama,  2008:  78-93, 
109).
 The destabilization of Iraq can be also seen when the issue of identity is 
addressed. As the dictatorial tendencies of the Iraqi rulers was increasing, identity 
based violence also increased. Among the opposition groups one of the most violent 
were the Iraqi Kurdish groups in the north.73
 Whether it be the identity question or the nature of the regime, oil was again 
at the center of most of the issues in Iraq during the Republic period. The armed 
forces consolidated their power by controlling the oil wealth. Similarly, distribution 
of  oil  wealth  among  the  different  regions  and  particularly  the  North  increased 
violence. The main difference between the pre-1958 coup period and the post-1958 
coup was the quantity of oil production in Iraq. 
 By  1958,  despite  vast  reserves,  Iraq  was  still  lagging  behind  other  oil 
producing countries in the region. One reason for this was the operational nature of 
the  foreign  oil  companies  operating  in  Iraq.  The  executors  of  the  1958  coup 
attempted to negotiate better terms for developing the Iraqi oil industry. At that time, 
the oil reserves of Iraq were developed by IPC and its subsidiaries.74 Thus in 1961, 
the Iraqi leadership passed a new law that limited the IPC rights to produce oil in 
areas  it  was  already producing  oil.  The  new law was  entitled  as  “Defining  the 
73 Like other opposition groups, the Iraqi Kurdish groups cheered and supported the 1958 coup. 
They had hoped that the new government would side with them on important issues. However, 
their demands of autonomy, bordering on independence, were ignored by the central government. 
The Iraqi Kurds in the north, led by Mustafa Barzani, fulfilled their threat of increasing the level 
of  violence.  In  1961  they  had  began  to  occupy  cities  in  the  north.  By  1963  the  Barzani's 
supporters had gained momentum and were establishing themselves in the north (Farouk-Sluglett 
and Sluglett, 1990: 79, 80, 81, 102, 104).
74 The subsidiaries  of  IPC were  the Basra  Petroleum Company (BPC)and the  Musul  Petroleum 
Company  (MPC).  The  participating  companies  in  the  IPC  were  based  in  Britain,  USA, 
Netherlands  and France.
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Exploration Areas of the Oil Companies”. It was also referred as the Law number 
80.75 This was the beginning of the rapid modernization process of the Iraqi Oil 
industry (Alnasrawi, 2002: 19-37). 
 In  1964,  the  Iraqi  government  created  the  Iraqi  National  Oil  Company 
(INOC).  Finally in 1967, INOC received the exclusive rights to produce oil in Iraq. 
This was another important step to develop the Iraqi oil industry (Alnasrawi, 2002: 
19-37). 
 Despite creating the groundwork for a national oil industry, the production 
levels did not significantly increase until the early and the mid 70s. Between 1960-
1970, the Iraqi oil output grew only by 4.3 percent. The regions' oil output on the 
other hand had increased by 13 percent. As the foreign oil companies were holding 
back the oil production in Iraq, they developed oil reserves in other countries such as 
in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Libya. Thus, the coup plotters had  believed that the 
foreign intervention in Iraqi oil sector and in Iraq in general was an impediment for 
economic development (Alnasrawi, 2002: 43-53; Samira, 1997: 111).
 The new regime that took power did institute some changes. It introduced the 
Detailed  Economic  Plan  (DEP).  This  development  plan  for  Iraq  was  the  most 
sophisticated  of  its  kind  developed  since  Iraq's  inception.  Furthermore,  agrarian 
reform was initiated and other social programs such as funding for housing projects 
were developed. Most of these reforms and programs, however failed or did not 
fulfill  their  objective.  By 1968,   the  inegalitarian  nature  of  the  society  had  not 
changed (Al-Marashi and Salama, 2008: 82; Tripp, 2007: 143-186; Alnarawi, 1994: 
35-55). 
75 The Law number 80 is still considered by many Iraqis as an important piece of legislation that is 
relevant in today's context. This will be throughly investigated in chapter 4.
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 3.4 The Ba'ath Period (1968-2003)
 Despite losing to the side of Colonel Arif in 1963, the Ba'ath Party was still 
an important force in Iraq. They proved their strength by staging the successful coup 
of 1968. The members of Ba'ath realized the threat the Iraq Armed Forces (IAF) had 
posed to all Iraqi regimes in the past. By 1975, using the infighting among army 
officers,  Ba'ath  managed  to  eliminate  many  non-Ba'athist  officers  in  the  armed 
forces.76  Yet the full control of the armed forces by the civilians was achieved only 
by 197977 (Al-Marashi and Salama, 2008: 112-116, Tripp,2007: 186-215).
 Although  the  civilian  wing,  namely  Saddam  Hussein,  had  achieved 
significant control over the army forces, the threat emanating from the army forces 
would not stop. Coup attempts would continue until the invasion of the US in 2003. 
Having  realized  the  threat  armed  forces  was  posing  to  any  regime  in  Iraq,  the 
Ba'athist regime decided to deal with this threat by making massive purges, raising 
the living standards of the soldiers and most importantly by creating parallel military 
forces and internal intelligence agencies  (Al-Marashi and Salama, 2008: 120, 125, 
127, 133, 175-176, 187, 188, 107-196).
 Until  2003, Saddam Hussein had created several parallel  military forces.78 
The Popular Army (PA)79, the Republican Guard (RG) and the Special Republican 
Guard (SRG) are three examples of these parallel military forces. These forces were
76 In the early 1970s,  the Ba'athist  regime had managed to thwart  several  coup attempts by the 
armed forces (Al-Marashi and Salama, 2008: 112-116).
77 After elimination of the non-Ba'athist officers, the military wing of the Ba'ath had to be brought 
under control as well. Thus, starting from 1968 until 1979, the army forces had to endure constant 
purges (Al-Marashi and Salama, 2008: 112-116, Tripp, 2007: 186-215).
78 These forces were also referred as the anti-military forces. (Al-Marashi and Salami, 2008: 124, 
187).
79 PA was sometimes also called the People's Army or the People's Militia. (Al-Marashi and Salami, 
2008: 125).
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created  in  order  to  stop  the  army  forces  from  mounting  a  coup.80 To  further 
consolidate  control  over  the armed forces,  intelligence organizations  such as  the 
Directorate of Political Guidance (DPG) was also established. In order to further 
diminish the chances of a coup, the armed forces direct access to ammunition was 
restricted by the Ba'ath officials (Al-Marashi and Salama, 2008: 120, 121 ,107-196).
 Between 1968 and 2003 the dictatorial nature of the Ba'ath control over the 
armed  forces  had  also  acquired  totalitarian  tendencies  and  spilled  over  to  the 
different segments of the society it was supposed to serve. The dictatorial regime 
with  totalitarian  tendencies  exacerbated  the  violence  that  had  its  roots  in  the 
previous  regimes.  Iraqi  Kurds  under  Mustafa  Barzani  continued  to  demand 
autonomy bordering on independence. There were several demands that were not 
acceptable in the eyes of the Iraqi people81 and the leadership. The demands were 
control over Kerkük , having  their own military forces independent from Baghdad, 
having a regional assembly and financial independence ( Tripp, 2007: 193, 204, 234; 
Cordesman and Hashim, 1997: 95, 96; Al-Marashi and Salama, 2008: 107-196).
 By 1974, the conflict between the Kurds and the government had evolved 
into a full blown war. The supporters of Barzani were fighting with support provided 
by the Iranians. However, the 1975 Algiers agreement between Iran and Iraq caused 
the  fighting in  the north to  stop.  This  was  because Iran had stopped supporting 
Barzani. The armed conflict restarted with the beginning of the Iran-Iraq war. The 
fighting continued until the defeat of the supporters of Barzani and Talabani in 1988. 
80 Interestingly enough  the  creation  of  parallel  military forces  forced  the  regime to  create  new 
parallel military forces to protect itself from the parallel forces it created. For example the reason 
for the creation of the SRG was to stop the coup attempts emanating from the RGs (Al-Marashi 
and Salami, 2008: 188).
81 Despite the hostilities among them, this feeling was shared by the Iraqi  Shi'ites and the Iraqi 
Sunni's (Cordesman and Hashim, 1997: 95-96).
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The no fly zone created after  the First  Gulf  War in 1991, allowed  Barzani and 
Talabani  to  reestablish  and  solidify  their  authoritarian  power  in  northern  Iraq. 
(Sluglett,1990: 164, 165-167, 170, 171, 189, 190; Tripp, 2007: 204-205, 236-237, 
256-257).
 In the south the Iraqi Shi'ites did not trust the new Ba'ath regime either. Just 
like the previous regimes, they considered the Ba'ath regime an instrument for the 
Iraqi  Sunni  to  control  Iraq.  The  Iraqi  Shi'ite  opposition  in  the  south  did  not 
perpetrate the same amount of violence as the Iraqi Kurds in the north. The events in 
1969, 1974-1977 and 1991 can be considered more as disturbances.82 Even though 
organizations such as the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution  (SCIR) in Iraq 
were founded and fought against the Ba'ath regime, they never represented all Iraqi 
Shi'ites. The Ba'ath regime used carrot and stick policy against the Iraqi Shi'ites. At 
certain times the regime provided benefits to loyal Iraqi Shi'ites and when it believed 
it  was  necessary  it  used  force  against  them83 (Tripp,  2007:  194-197,237-239; 
Cordesman and Hashim, 1997: 98-101; Wiley, 2003: 158).
The Ba'ath regime was able to build its military machinery and sustain its 
oppressive  regime  mainly  because  of  the  revenues  acquired  from the  oil  trade. 
Furthermore,  one  of  the  fundamental  elements  that  had  defined  the  conflict  in 
northern Iraq was oil rich Kerkük. The Ba'ath regime built on the foundations of the 
oil  industry,  General  Qassim  had  laid  in  1958.  By  1975,  Ba'ath  regime  had 
82 These disturbances were not in the same scale as in the north. The events in 1991 are called 
disturbances because they were too small and sporadic in nature (Cordesman and Hashim, 1997: 
101; Tripp, 2007: 248-249).
83 This cordial relationship based on the carrot and stick policy was also made possible due to the 
nature of the Iraqi Shi'ites. Iraqi Shi'ites are a minority from two perspectives. They are a Shi'ite 
minority among Arabs and a Arab minority among the Shi'ites. This allows, and forces them to be 
much more flexible then other groups (Wiley, 2003).
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completely nationalized the oil industry. The IPC, BPC and the MPC were dissolved 
and their operations handed over to INOC. (Alnasrawi, 2002: 26, 54). 
In 1972 Iraq began to use loans from the USSR, Hungary and East Germany 
to modernize its oil industry. The payment for the equipment and expertise provided 
by these  countries  was  in  the  form of  oil.  It  bought  oil  tankers,  laid  pipelines, 
developed markets at home and abroad, built loading terminals, export facilities and 
refineries. INOC was given the responsibility of funding the building of a modern, 
developed Iraqi state (Alnasrawi, 2002: 26-28). 
All  the  above  mentioned  precautions  had  allowed  Iraq  to  raise  its  oil 
production from 1.5 million barrels per day (MBD) in 1972  to 3.5 MBD in 1979. 
By  1979  the  revenue  from  oil  had  increased  to  26  Billion  Dollars  in  1979 
(Alnasrawi,2002: 26-28). 84
The Ba'ath regime did develop plans to use the oil revenues for developing 
different industrial  sectors.  This was desired because it  was felt  that  Iraq had to 
diversify its economy in order attain a better development rate. Yet, just like in the 
previous regimes, the plans were never fully implemented. In fact, during the time of 
Ba'ath  regime Iraq became more dependent  on oil  then ever  before.  (Alnasrawi, 
2002: 48). 
By 2003, the Iraqi oil industry, like Iraq itself was devastated. The damage 
inflicted to the Iraqi oil industry during the Iran-Iraq War (September 1980 - August 
1988)  and the  First  Gulf  War  (August  1990 -  February 1991)  was  compounded 
because of the sanctions imposed  by the United Nations Security Council. In 1996, 
after Iraq was able to resume its oil export,  the long years of damage in the oil 
84 For further information please consult Appendix D.
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industry did not  allow financing  its  reconstruction.  Iraq's  oil  production  was  far 
beyond  its  capacity  and  the  status  of  its  oil  sector  further  deteriorated  until  its 
collapse after the 2003 invasion  (Alnasrawi, 2002: 135-159; Kumins, 2005: 2).
3.5 Discussion
Iraq's history until 2003 can be described as a repetition of  failed attempts in 
its  state  building  efforts  and  a  consequent  vicious  cycle  of  unrest  and  at  times 
violence.  Iraq's  future  was  sealed  by  the  actions  of  the  British  Imperial 
Administration in the 1920s. The British rule had hampered the social and political 
fabric of the society and its leadership that would assure the weakening of its state 
building efforts and finally its collapse by 2003.  The role of oil, national identity 
and the armed forces were particularly important in the historical trajectory of state 
building in Iraq.
Iraq owes its very existence to oil. As the British were invading the three 
provinces they wanted to ensure guaranteed access to the vast oil reserves in these 
former  provinces  of  the  Ottoman  Empire.  Thus,  they  “invented”  Iraq.  Oil  was 
another  excuse  for  the  British  to  regularly  intervene  in  the  Iraqi  politics. 
Furthermore,  the  Iraqi  oil  companies  controlled  by  the  Western  countries,  with 
Britain and British companies being the most important shareholders, did not give 
enough consideration to the needs of the Iraqi people. In the eyes of the Iraqi people, 
the Western powers saw them as a market for their goods and a cheap source for raw 
materials.  This  in  turn  fed  the  anti  imperialistic  tendencies  among  the  Iraqi 
population.85
85 The anti-imperialistic  tendencies  presented  themselves  in  various  ideological  forms.  Three  of 
these were Pan Arabism, Iraqi nationalism and communism.
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The role of national identity in Iraq's state building also deserves specific 
attention. In the late 19th century and early twentieth century, the Western world was 
moving  towards  a  more  individualistic  society.  Yet  the  British  administrators, 
disregarding the history of the region, preferred to understand the region from an 
Orientalist  point  of  view.  They  dismantled  the  societal  structures  in  order  to 
reconstruct it according to their world view. At the end they not only failed in this 
respect, but they also caused the creation of a more divided society. Furthermore, 
they allowed sectarian and ethnic divisions to enter and grow inside the government 
structures like the armed forces. All segments of the Iraqi society contributed to this 
by refusing to negotiate with other segments of the society, which  in turn further 
destabilized the country.
The anti-imperialistic inclinations and the ethnic and sectarian fragility of the 
country gave  birth  to  the  modern  IAF.  The  armed  forces  was  seen  as  the  only 
institution that could protect Iraq from the imperial powers and secure the territorial 
integrity of Iraq.  Eventually, the army took upon itself the duty, to not only protect 
the country against  foreign armed forces but also,  to guide it  to modernity.  This 
process allowed the armed forces to evolve from a moderating actor to being the 
authoritarian ruling institution of the country. Moreover, the infighting among the 
officers in the army forces allowed a civilian, Saddam Hussein, to rise to power and 
guide Iraq to total ruin. The fuel of these failures that allowed state building efforts 
to go awry, was oil.
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CHAPTER IV
IRAQ REVISITED
This chapter is divided into three sections. The first section deals with the 
historical progress of the invasion and its aftermath. The analysis is conducted in the 
line of three factors that have been introduced in chapter two, namely the level of 
engagement,  regional  factors  and  legitimacy.  The  second  section  and  the  third 
section presents the issue of the constitution and the Draft Federal Oil and Gas Law 
(FOGL). Despite being part of the legitimacy factor, the constitution is investigated 
under a separate section.  Because it  has a significant impact on the current state 
building process in Iraq. 86
                        
4.1 The US and State Building
 As with the previous external state building efforts, the history of Iraq 2003 
onwards  is  investigated  in  light  of  the  three  main  factors.  First,  the  level  of 
engagement is assessed. Second, the role of the regional factors is examined. Third, 
86 Unlike the previous chapters the order in which the three factors are investigated is different. This 
because of organizational reasons. As the constitution was investigated as an separate section, the 
legitimacy factor  had  to  be  moved  to  the  last  part  of  section  in  order  to  achieve  a  smooth 
transition.
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the  importance  of  legitimacy  is  questioned.  Furthermore,  the  specific  historical 
trajectory of state building is incorporated into the analysis by examining how the 
development  of  the  level  of  engagement,  regional  factors  and  the  legitimacy of 
intervention interact with the issues of oil, national identity and the armed forces.
4.1.1 The Level of Engagement 
Before  the invasion  of  Iraq,  there  was considerable  evidence that  the  US 
decision  makers  planned  the  intervention  through  the  assertions  of  Fast  Track 
Democratizers. The decision makers perceived that the US would invade Iraq and 
the people would welcome the US. After the invasion, the US would keep the formal 
institutions  of  Iraq  and  would  use  them  for  keeping  the  peace  in  the  country. 
Eventually the former dictatorial state and its institutions would transform and Iraq 
would  become a  modern  liberal  democracy.  It  was  believed  that  all  this  would 
require modest resources. This line of thinking could be seen from the statements of 
high ranking US Officials. For example, then the National Security Adviser of the 
US had stated that “ … the concept was that we would defeat the army, but the 
institutions would hold, everything from ministries to police forces...”.  This state 
building process would be supervised by the Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld. 
Yet mistakes made by the US did not allow the realization of the above stated plan 
(Dodge, 2009: 95). Some of these can be analyzed according to the three indicators 
(civilian, political and military scope) of the level of engagement factor.  
 After the initial invasion, the US Office for Reconstruction and Humanitarian 
Assistance (ORHA) was responsible for the reconstruction efforts in Iraq. After few 
months,  the  responsibilities  of  ORHA were  transferred  to  a  new  authority,  the 
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Coalition Provisional  Authority (CPA). The new authority would effectively rule 
Iraq until June 2004. The CPA headed by Ambassador Paul Bremer, despite its short 
tenure, would have profound impact on what Iraq would incur during the coming 
years. As the CPA would be responsible for the civilian scope of the operation, the 
Combined Joint Task Force 7 (CJTF-7) would be responsible for the military scope 
of the operation. The CJTF-7 was initially headed by  Lieutenant General Ricardo 
Sanchez   (Al-Marashi and Salama, 2008: 201-204; Payne, 2006: 609).
 The  above  organizational  arrangement  had  several  problems.  One  was 
regarding the structure of the CPA. According to the official description the CPA 
was a multinational organization. Yet in reality it received 60 percent of its funding 
from the US and there was a minority non US staff. One of the important positions 
under the head of CPA was supposed to filled by the British. Yet the British never 
got truly involved with the CPA (Dobbins, et.al. 2009: 13,14).
 On other side, there was a problem with the US staff of the CPA and the US 
bureaucracy in general. Head of the CPA, Bremer, tried to reiterate that the CPA was 
not an US bureaucratic organization. Yet according to some US departments the CPA 
was part of the US bureaucracy and was thus subject to the same rules and command 
structures.  One of  the  specific  disagreements  that  occurred  was about  the  funds 
generated by the Food for Oil Program of the UN. The disagreement was whether 
this money would be only utilized for the Iraqis. (Dobbins, et.al. 2009: 13,14)
 The disagreement about the status of the CPA presented only a symptom of a 
larger problem, namely the lack of unity of command. The examinations of previous 
state-building efforts led by an external actor have shown that the unity of command 
can be very useful. However, in the case of Iraq the unity of command had broken 
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down. This in turn was detrimental to the above stated objectives of US decision 
makers. 
 The US had an operational procedure on what the relationship was between 
an Ambassador and the military on the ground. In order to avoid any complications 
additional measures were in put place. According to this, both the CPA and CJTF-7 
would be responsible to the Secretary of Defense (SoD). SoD would be a conduit to 
the  administration  and  would  be  able  to  iron  out  any  troubles  rising  from 
jurisdictional  matters.  However,  the  head  of  CPA circumvented  this  system  by 
communicating  directly  with  the  President  of  the  US.  This  in  turn  caused  the 
collapse of the system. Due to this the Defense Department (DoD) was not in charge 
anymore. Thus, it was not clear if the original plan advocated by the members of the 
administration would be employed. Besides the trouble of implementing the original 
plan, the unanticipated change in the command structure caused other problems as 
well. One of them was the issue of jurisdiction. The staff of the CPA and the CJTF-7 
was colliding on different matters  (Dobbins, et.al. 2009: 14-19).
 Accordingly , the unity of command collapsed and the initial plan was not 
implemented.  On  paper  the  CPA was  responsible  for  the  civilian  scope  of  the 
operation  and  the  military  scope  fell  under  the  jurisdiction  of  CJTF-7. Yet 
immediately after his arrival, Ambassador Bremer made one of the most important 
decisions that would fall under the military scope indicator. One of his first order 
was the dismissal of the entire Iraqi Armed Forces (IAF). This decision had a long 
lasting adverse effect in several ways.  (Dobbins, et.al. 2009: 17, 18, 100-105; Al-
Marashi and Salama, 2008: 204).
Initially,  the head of  ORHA, Jay Garner  had announced that  the military 
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would  be  kept  intact  and  would  help  the  coalition  forces  to  rebuild  their  own 
country. Furthermore, the American military officials' silence was misunderstood by 
the civilian US Administrators87 in Iraq. The US Army officials had believed that 
once the IAF was disbanded, the ex-army officers would be recalled to staff the new 
military of Iraq (Dobbins, et.al. 2009: 100-105; Al-Marashi and Salama, 2008: 204).
 Paul Bremer had stated several reasons for disbanding the IAF. First of all, he 
stated that the armed forces had been the tool of oppression during Iraq's history. 
Second, the Iraqi Shi'ites and the Iraqi Kurds would not accept the continuation of 
such an organization and that this would be a counterproductive to the rebuilding 
process. Bremer even cited the words uttered by the Jalal Talabani, the head of the 
Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). Talabani had stated that the IAF represented the 
machinery of Arab nationalism that had plagued Iraq for so long (Al-Marashi and 
Salama, 2008: 203). 
The removal of IAF was followed by the creation of the Iraqi Civil Defense 
Corp  (ICDC)  in  2003.  According  to  the  CPA the  new  Iraqi  army  would  be 
constituted of 40,000 personnel. The IAF prior to the invasion was around 400,000 
men. Furthermore, it would not have an air force or a navy.  The idea was that the 
IAF would be composed of light infantry and would ensure security in Iraq and 
would be backed by the US Military. The US was following a similar tactic that the 
British Imperial Administration had laid down eighty years before the US presence 
in Iraq. They too envisioned an IAF consisting of light infantry which would be 
supported by the British Military (Al-Marashi and Salama, 2008: 210-213).
Due to the deteriorating security situation, the US administrators realized that 
87  This also included the highest civilian administrator, Paul Bremer.
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the  new IAF would  not  be  able  to  hold  its  ground.  Thus,  the  parameters  were 
changed. The new IAF would now be composed of 200,000 men. Furthermore, it 
would include mechanized units,  an air  force and a  navy.  The ineffective ICDC 
would  later  be  reorganized  as  the  National  Guard  (NG).  This  reorganization 
coincided with the handing over of power to the Iraqis in 2004. In 2005, the NG was 
reorganized yet again as the new IAF. The ineffective nature of the new IAF had not 
changed. For example, by 2007 the Iraqi Air Force (IAF) consisted only of some 
helicopters and transport airplanes. It was not able to provide the necessary support 
to the army units  (Al-Marashi and Salama,2008: 210-219).
 This action by the CPA was in contradiction to the lessons learned in the 
previous state building efforts. It is accurate that in the case of Germany the US had 
demobilized  the  German  Armed  Forces  (GAF)88 .  Yet  there  was  not  a  security 
concern in Germany. The order had been maintained by US troops. Also the German 
police was being rapidly trained by the US to take most of their duties. 
This was not the case in Iraq. The US Army was not even able to protect the 
Iraqi  Ministries  and  their  installations.  Immediately  after  the  conclusion  of  the 
invasion, 17 out of 23 ministries had been looted. Also, the Iraqi police which was 
not demobilized  would become one of the least efficient institutions of the new 
Iraqi regime (Dobbins, et.al.  2009: 100-105; Al-Marashi and Salama, 2008: 204; 
Dodge, 2009: 95).
The above stated events in turn negatively affected the civilian scope of the 
operation.  On  the  issue  of  economic  development,  specifically  in  securing 
employment for Iraqi people, the US had failed. This was especially the case with 
88  Despite the initial demobilization of the GAF, only a few years later the US had began to rebuild 
the GAF.
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the  members  of  the  dissolved  IAF.  As  the  army  was  being  dissolved,  the 
compensations provided for the ex-officers were either too late, too little or both. 
This  in  turn,  among  other  reasons,  contributed  to  the  growth  of  the  military 
opposition against the US (Al-Marashi and Salama:2008).
Another problem that falls under the civilian scope category was the state of 
the Iraqi institutions. The first order of Bremer, as the head of CPA, was called ‘The 
De-Ba’athification  of  the  Iraqi  Society’.  This  order  had  caused  the  dismissal  of 
almost 120,000 bureaucrats of the Iraqi government. The de-Ba’athification program 
removed the last elements of the Iraqi bureaucratic infrastructure (Dodge, 2009: 95).
A civil service that had to endure abuse of a dictatorial regime, three wars, 
sanctions and post-2003 violence was dealt its final blow. Even by 2007 the Iraqi 
bureaucracy had not managed to recover itself from the this collapse (Dodge,2009: 
96; Ballard, 2007: 202). This is another fact that shows the US had not studied the 
past  state  building processes  carefully.  Because  even in  cases  such  as  Germany, 
except for the high ranking officers, the bureaucracy was left largely intact.
Under  the  civilian  scope  another  problem  had  presented  itself  at  the 
legitimacy front. The CPA under Bremer was essentially the legislative, judicial and 
executive branch of Iraq. Yet by the end of its tenure in 2004, the decrees of CPA 
were not being implemented by the Iraqi judiciary (Dobbins, et.al. 2009: 14, 15, 28-
29).
4.1.2 The Regional Factors
The US' ignorance of the regional history had shown by negatively affecting 
the state building process. One of these mistakes was  misunderstanding the concept 
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of Arab nationalism in Iraq. Emergence of Arab nationalism and hostility towards 
the West can be traced back to the actions of the British Imperial Administration. 
There were several  facts  that  the Iraqi population,  Sunni or Shi'ite,  resented.  An 
important one was the humiliation the Iraqi population had to endure in the hands of 
British. Since the Iraqis were not in control of their own armed forces, the British 
had established their own command structure. The Iraqi officers had felt that they 
were just a conduit to relay information to the soldiers (Al-Marashi and Salama: 
2008;  Dodge:  2003).  This  and  other  factors  (see  Chapter  3)  had  inflamed  Arab 
nationalism which would eventually allow Ba'ath and later Saddam Hussein to come 
power in Iraq.
A similar path was taken by the US which resulted similarly. Thus, when the 
US  had  officially  disbanded  the  IAF,  feelings  of  betrayal  and  humiliation  had 
resurfaced among the Iraqi population. Then, the Americans repeated the command 
structure of the British by establishing a similar chain of command for the new IAF. 
The  IAF  was  to  be  commanded  by  an  American  structure  called  the  Iraq  War 
Multi-National  Transitional  Security  Command (MNTSC).  This  compounded the 
feeling of  humiliation  among an  important  segment  of  the  Iraqi  population  (Al-
Marashi and Salama, 2008: 199-224).
Furthermore, the US administration and particularly the CPA misunderstood 
the historical context and structure in which the IAF was created and operated. CPA 
had believed that the IAF would not be accepted by the Iraqi Kurds or the Iraqi 
Shi'ites.  Furthermore,  the  IAF  was  seen  as  an  uncivilized  institution  that  was 
designed  for  one  purpose,  torturing  of  the  Iraqi  people  (Al-Marashi  and 
Salama,2008: 199-224).
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This was not the case. Despite its faults the IAF was seen as the protector of 
Iraq  against  domestic  and  international  enemies.  The  IAF  had  acquired  this 
reputation because it was the only institution that was able to stand up against the 
interference of foreign powers. Furthermore, this was not only the view of the Iraqi 
Sunni's but it was the view of the Iraqi Shi'ites as well. None of the regimes in Iraq 
could  have  survived  without  the  cooperation  of  some  Iraqi  Kurds  or  the  Iraqi 
Shi'ites. The cooperation could be seen in the history of IAF. The army was one of 
the most important government institution where individuals belonging to different 
ethnic, religious denominations existed together89 This was another reason why the 
IAF was an important institution in Iraq (Al-Marashi and Salama,2008: 199-224).
Another perception that was inaccurate regarding the army was its nature. 
The CPA believed that the IAF was Saddam Hussein's  personnel  machinery that 
obeyed  every  command  of  Saddam  Hussein.  The  previous  chapter  presented  a 
different reality. The army was a complex Iraqi institution. It was a mirror of the 
Iraqi society. Furthermore, at various points, in various degrees it shaped the future 
of the Iraqi society.  It  never fully accepted the authority of the Iraqi  politicians, 
including the authority of Saddam Hussein, or the King. It saw them as complicit 
actors  working  together  with  the  imperial  powers  or  it  believed  that  the  Iraqi 
politicians were incapable of furthering on the path of modernization.
The army's attempts of interference in the politics of Iraq had continued until 
2003 invasion. The only difference was that Saddam Hussein's regime was able to 
stop the army much more successfully then any other regimes of Iraq. During these 
89  This does not mean that the army was an unbiased organization. It  was marred with different 
problems. One of these was the opportunities the Iraqi Sunni individuals received for promotion. 
Yet in the context of Iraq, the army was far better then most other institutions in representing 
different segments of the Iraqi society.
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attempts to remove Saddam Hussein, the Iraqi Sunni members of the army received 
the  harshest  treatment,  whereby  most  of  them were  executed.  (Al-Marashi  and 
Salama,2008: 204).
Furthermore, not all of the atrocities attributed to the IAF were committed by 
the IAF. The Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) were not a monolithic organization. Saddam 
Hussein,  in  order  to  protect  his  regime,  had created parallel  security forces.  For 
example,  the Fedayeen and the SRGs were responsible  for suppressing both the 
Shi'ite and IAF units rebellion in the South (Al-Marashi and Salama, 2008).
Another issue that the US had ignored was the fact of ethnic and sectarian 
divisions in the region. For example, CPA had allowed the individuals like Barzani 
and Talabani to keep their militias (peshmerges). The main argument for allowing to 
keep their militias came from Barzani and Talabani. Both stated to the CPA that the 
Peshmerge were not militias but the pride of the local population in the north. In turn 
the Iraqi Sunni and Iraqi Shi'ite leaders argued that as long as the Peshmerge were 
allowed to operate there was no reason for them to disband their militias. These and 
other actions further strengthened the positions of the militias and contributed to the 
deterioration of the security situation in the country (Al-Marashi and Salama: 2008).
The US occupation administration have contributed to this by indulging tribal 
and communal leaders in their exclusionary policies.  It continued this even after the 
end of the tenure of the CPA and during the attempts to form a new IAF. These 
actions  even  caused  demands  for  discriminatory  rules.  For  example,  the  Iraqi 
Kurdish leaders demanded that only Iraqi Kurds should serve in the military units 
stationed in the north. This and other acts by the members of the Iraqi society had 
contributed to the creation of a new divided IAF (Al-Marashi and Salama, 2008: 
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217). The Iraqi history has demonstrated the dangers of communal divisions in the 
army, leading to military coups and negatively affecting the state building process. 
Another  lesson  of  state  building  the  US  had  ignored  was  regarding  the 
importance  of  cooperation  with  the  neighboring  nations.  The  Afghan  and  the 
Bosnian  cases  had  clearly  shown  the  importance  of  cooperation  among  the 
neighboring countries in the state building process.  Although, rhetorically the goals 
of the neighbors of Iraq and the US were similar, the US initially precluded any 
cooperation with the neighbors Iraq (Oliker, et al, 2007: 29).
The uncooperative nature of the US was one of the reasons why some of 
Iraq's neighbors had began to support certain factions in the Iraqi Civil War. For 
example,  as  Saudi  Arabia  was  supporting  armed  Iraqi  Sunni  groups,  Iran  was 
supporting armed Iraqi Shi'ite groups. Due to this support the conflict had ranged on 
more then it should (Oliker, et al, 2007: 29).
By  2007,  the  US  had  somewhat  changed  its  policy  toward  regional 
cooperation. While the US had not attended the Iraq's Neighbors Conference (INC) 
before, it did attend the March 2007 conference. The successful conference process 
will continue with the 6th conference to be held in 2009. (Oliker, et al, 2007: 29; 
Cumhuriyet, 2008(a); CNN Turk, 2008; NTVMSNBC, 2008; BBC, 008).
4.1.3 The Importance Legitimacy
During the post-cold war era,  which witnessed the majority of state building 
cases, the prevailing attitude was that the peacekeeping or state building operations 
had  to  be  mandated  by  the  UN.  This  provided  the  operation  in  question  with 
legitimacy. Yet despite this fact, on the issue of legitimacy the US had continued to 
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ignore the precedences set by state building cases during the post-cold war era.
The majority of the international community did not support the invasion of 
Iraq. Specifically, UNSC members such as  France, China and Russia opposed the 
invasion  of  Iraq.  Due  to  this,  even  though  the  UN  had  acknowledged  the  US 
authority over Iraq, it did not endorse it. It treated the US presence in accordance 
with the relevant UN articles on invasion.90 Thus,  the  US  was  not  bound  by  the 
usual rules that associated with the  UN Mandated Multilateral Peace Operations.91 
This gave the US a more free hand in its operations in Iraq. However, it also limited 
the help it received form the international community (Dobbins, et.al. 2009: 12-13).
Furthermore,  a constitution is  an important  tool  in establishing legitimacy 
and ideally a democracy during the state building process. It sets the rules for issues 
such as elections, governance of the country, civilian rule over the army etc. Despite 
its shortcomings an Iraqi Constitution was adopted by 2005 and is still in effect.
There are several elements which could be helpful in the analysis of the Iraqi 
constitution and the draft Federal Oil and Gas Law, (FOGL). The issues of national 
identity,  the  IAF  and  oil  were  important  in  the  historical  trajectory of  the  state 
building process in Iraq. These three factors and the method in which they were 
addressed were responsible for the collapse of the state building process in Iraq. 
Thus,  it  is  important  to  understand  how  they  were  addressed  in  the  current 
constitution of Iraq.
 The Iraqi constitution was drafted in a hasty matter and at a time of civil war 
environment. The constitutional writing process commenced with the adoption of 
90  Iraq was treated as an conquered country. Because of this, the US drew even more international 
condemnation.
91  For example the US did not have to report back to a commission at UN. 
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the  Transnational  Administrative  Law  (TAL)  by  the  Interim Governing  Council 
(IGC).  The TAL would hold elections in January 2005 and the resulting Transitional 
National Assembly (TNA) would draft a constitution by August 15 of the same year. 
This draft constitution would eventually be adopted by 15th October 2005. Yet the 
problems  began  during  the  election  process  itself.  The  Sunni  parties  wanted  to 
boycott the election due to the fact that Iraq was a occupied country. The problems 
were  compounded  during  the  writing  period  of  the  constitution  The  ethnic  and 
sectarian hostilities slowed down the process. The violence that was occurring at the 
time  also  effected  the  talks.  At  one  point  the  Sunni  parties  withdrew from the 
process because of the assassinations of two Sunni politicians (Al-Marashi, 2005: 
139-150). These events had negatively effected the end result, namely the final draft 
of the constitution. Thus, it can be said that it is a document containing unresolved 
issues and contradicting articles that put shadow over its legitimacy. 
  The  analysis  of  the  draft  FOGL  is  particularly  important  because  as 
demonstrated through the historical trajectory of state building in Iraq in chapter 2, 
Iraq's future is dependent on oil and gas in several aspects. An adequate law for the 
exploration of oil and gas reserves would secure sovereign rights on oil wealth and 
limit foreign influence. This in turn would not injure the pride of the Iraqi people. 
Thus, the Iraqi nationalism would not resurface in the same manner as it did in the 
past. This finally would contribute to the creation of a more peaceful environment 
which would not hinder the state building process of Iraq. Acknowledging that the 
constitution is the primary document, the draft FOGL is an essential complementary 
document that further clarifies what the constitution could not. 
 The Iraqi Federal Constitution can be characterized as a work in progress. 
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The constitution is made up of six sections and does address critical issues regarding 
Iraq.  However,  there  are  also  gaps,  contradictions  and  unclear  issues  in  the 
constitution.
 The  constitution  does  try  to  address  the  historically  problematic  issue  of 
national-identity. In Article Number 2 the Iraqi states religion is defined as Islam. 
This and other articles guarantee the Islamic nature of Iraq.92 This was one of the 
goals of Shi'ite majority of Iraq (Al-Marashi,2005). The writers of the constitution 
tried  to  use  a  federal  framework.  For  example,  on  the  issue  of  language  the 
complexity of the Iraqi Constitution emerges. Official languages are evaluated in 
two different levels. These are the national and regional level. At the national level 
all official documents must written in Iraqi Arab and Iraqi Kurdish languages. At the 
regional level according to the appropriate levels of density, Iraqi Turkmen and Iraqi 
Syriac languages could be used as official  languages. Furthermore,  the federalist 
nature  of  the  constitution  can  be  seen  from  the  fact  that  it  stipulates  that  any 
governor  can  adopt  a  language  as  official  through  the  use  of  referendum (Iraqi 
Constitution, Articles 3 and 4).93
 One of the contradictions can be observed on the issue of national identity. 
The preamble of the Iraqi Constitution starts with the phrase “...We, the people of 
Mesopotamia...”. This phrasing mimics the approach of Saddam Hussein. During his 
reign he had attempted to develop an identity that the synthesis of Iraq nationalism, 
Pan  Arabism  and  a  so  called  Mesopotamian  identity  (Al-Marashi,  2005:  139). 
Despite this  wording of the constitution and other actions, the unity of the Iraqi 
92  Although without elaborating much on this the constitution also states (Article 2.B) that no law 
shall be in violation of democratic nature of Iraq.
93  What constitutes as “dense” is not defined.
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population has still not been achieved.
 The ethnic tensions were fueled in part by the initial soft stance of the CPA 
which accommodated the secessionist tendencies of the Iraqi Kurdish leaders. One 
of these tendencies was actions like allowing the Peshmerge to grow in power and 
numbers.94 Also another  example  can be given  from the  statements  of  the  KRG 
leaders, who argued that only IAF units staffed exclusively by the Iraqi Kurds could 
be stationed in the north. This ethnically discriminatory statements are actually not 
allowed under the new constitution (Article 7). Yet no action was taken against the 
individuals which stated these views.
 Despite the acceptance of the KRG of the Iraqi Constitution, it does still try 
break it in other ways as well. The KRG leaders act with secessionist inclinations. 
One way this is being done is by distorting the population facts. Since 2003, the 
KRG has been moving Iraqi Kurds into Kerkük in order to increase the chance of its 
claim that Kerkük belongs only to the Iraqi Kurds, as opposed to the entire Iraqi 
nation. This and other attempts at trying to change the multi-ethnic composition of 
Kerkük could potentially ignite a new civil war.95  Kerkük  has witnessed significant 
ethnic violence since 2003. 96 (Chuloc, 2009; Borger 2008).
 On the surface the constitution seems to  solve the question regarding the 
nature of the Republic.   According to the constitution: “...The Republic of Iraq is an 
94  As other militia groups were being disbanded.
95  Kerkük is composed of Iraqi Kurds (60 percent), Iraqi Arabs and Iraqi Turkmens (both totaling 
40 percent) (Borger 2008).
96  One of them was when an Iraqi Kurdish mob attacked the headquarters of the Iraqi Turkmen 
party in 2008. It should also be mentioned that the Iraqi Kurds themselves also were the target of 
violence ( Cumhuriyet, 2008b).
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independent, sovereign nation, and the system of rule in it is a democratic, federal97, 
representative  (parliamentary)  republic...”  (Iraqi  Constitution,  Article  2).   The 
constitution also does  implicitly state  that  no entity in Iraq can secede from the 
Union.  This  can  be  seen  from the  wording  of  Article  107.  It  states  that  “...The 
federal  authority  will  maintain  the  unity  of  Iraq,  its  integrity,  independence, 
sovereignty and its democratic federal system...”.
 IAF, has been an important actor in  the historical  trajectory of Iraqi  state 
building  process.   It  has  played  the  role  of  mediator,  the  role  of  the  ruler  and 
eventually caused the dictatorial  regime in Iraq. This is turn caused the eventual 
collapse  in  2003.  Thus,  on  the  issue  of  the  IAF,  the  constitution  is  very  clear. 
According  to  the  constitution,  the   IAF  is  under  the  control  of  civilians  (Iraqi 
Constitution, Articles 9, 73,78,80,99 and 110). In its composition and service, the 
IAF cannot discriminate among the citizens of Iraq 98 (Iraqi Constitution, Article 9). 
Thirdly, the Iraqi Army is prohibited in any way from trying to influence civilian 
democratic process. The members of IAF cannot participate in any civilian elections 
as long as they are part of the IAF. 
 Oil was a crucial mean for obtaining and keeping power in Iraq. This method 
was used first by the Iraqi elite99,  then the IAF and eventually Saddam Hussein. 
Accordingly, it is important to focus on how the constitution does deal with the issue 
of  oil  and  gas.  However,  it  does  not  manage to  clarify  the  issue  to  any body's 
97  This point, according to some scholars is open to debate. Because the constitution does not utilize 
the Arabized English word “fidirali”. They utilize the word “ittihadi” which comes from ittihad. 
Ittihadi can also be translated as the “the Union” (Al-Marashi,2005).
98  This is a reference the to pre-2003 IAF. Before the creation of the new IAF, the higher ranks of 
the IAF were primarily Iraqi Sunni in origin.
99  The King and the landowners.
86
satisfaction. Article 111 states that “...Oil and gas are owned by all the people of Iraq 
in  all  the  regions  and  governorates...”.  Articles  implicitly  state  that  the  natural 
resources should be under the jurisdiction of the federal government.100  Yet Article 
112.1 implies that the “present fields” be jointly operated. This presents a problem in 
many aspects  (Ipek,  2007).  One of  them is  regarding  the  definition  of  “present 
fields”. Does “present fields” imply just the developed oil and gas fields or also the 
undeveloped  oil  and  gas  fields?   It  is  stated  in  the  draft  FOGL that  the  final 
document will contain an Annex that lists the developed and the undeveloped fields 
(FOGL,Article 4 and Annex 3). This might provide further qualification regarding 
the term “present fields”. Another problem is regarding the issue of revenue sharing. 
The Article 112.1 further states that the revenues acquired from the production of 
natural resource from the “present fields” shall:
    ...be  (distributed)  … in  a  fair  manner  in  proportion  to  the  population 
distribution in all parts of the country, specifying an allotment for a specified 
period for the damaged regions which were unjustly deprived of them by the 
former regime, and the regions that were damaged afterwards in a way that 
ensures balanced development in different areas of the country...
This contradicts with article 111 which states that the oil revenues belong to 
all Iraqi citizens, regardless of their ethnic or sectarian affiliation. Also how will the 
unjustly treated regions be defined? It should be noted that the use of violence and 
oppression was not limited to the central government in Iraq. For example, the Iraqi 
Kurds under the leadership of Barzani (father and son) and Talabani have constantly 
employed the use of violence. This can be seen even today from the statements of 
the  Iraqi  Kurdish  Regional  Government  (KRG)  officials.  It  was  stated  that 
companies who will win the contracts awarded by the Iraqi Ministry of Oil (IMO) 
100 Since the natural resources belong to all Iraqi people.
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cannot  operate  in  the  north  safely  without  their  explicit  support.  (Abbas,  2009; 
Rasheed and Web,2009a).
It should be noted that even though the draft FOGL extends the powers of the 
federal government, it does not necessarily achieve the desired outcome. A major 
reason for this is because it is still a draft (since 2007) and has not been approved by 
the Iraqi legislature.
On another point the draft FOGL does address the issue of operation of the 
oil  fields.  According  to  Article  5,  The  Council  of  Ministers  (CoM)  will  be 
responsible for the formulation and implementation of oil and gas policy of Iraq. 
The CoM will be assisted by the Federal Oil and Gas Council (FOGC). The FOGC 
will be created by the CoM. The FOGC will consists of representatives from  the 
following groups:
    1 - the Federal Government’s Ministers of Oil, Finance, and Planning;
    2 - the Director of the Iraq Central Bank;
    3 - a Regional government minister representing each Region;
   4 - a representative from each Producing Governorate not included in a 
     Region;
  5-  the  Chief  Executives  of  important  related  petroleum companies    
including the Iraq National Oil Company and the Oil Marketing  
Company; and                                                                      
    6-  Experts in petroleum, finance, and economy, with their number not 
     exceeding three(3), to be appointed for a period not exceeding  
     five (5) years based on a resolution from the Council of ministers     
     (FOGL, Article 5).
The FOGL despite creating a complicated array of hierarchy regarding the oil 
and gas resources in Iraq, it does introduce more confusion regarding some issues. 
One of these is the overlapping jurisdictional powers. For example “...several parties 
are simultaneously responsible for pre-qualification of contractors, approval of
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operators, approval of field development plans and third party financing...” (Said, 
2007: 3).
Regarding the policy towards the multinational energy companies, the Law 
envisions  that  the  already  developed  field  would  be  operated  by  the  INOC. 
Regarding the undeveloped fields it  seems that the draft FOGL envisions for the 
fields to be divided between INOC and Multinational Energy Companies. Yet it does 
not state which fields will be open for MNCs and which fields will be reserved for 
INOC (FOGL, Annex 3).101
On the issue of  revenue sharing,  the draft  FOGL envisions that  all  funds 
received from oil revenues be deposited into one fund. This fund will be refereed as 
the Oil  Revenue Fund (ORF). The ORF shall be regulated by the federal revenue 
law.  The  funds  available  from  the  ORF  shall  be  distributed  by  the  federal 
government according to the constitution. Yet the current of the federal revenue law 
might cause a conflict in this regard. Since the oil reserves are clustered in certain 
regions  this  may create  a  conflict  during the  distribution  of  oil  revenues.102 The 
distribution scheme will also include the creation of The Future Fund (TFF). The 
draft FOGL states that certain amount of the funds in ORF must be transferred to 
TFF103 (FOGL, Article 11).
4.2 The Current State of Iraq and its Oil and Gas Industry:
 The state of the Iraqi petroleum industry as of July 2009 is chaotic. The draft 
101 This because the FOGL has been at the draft stage for over 2 years. The Annex number 3, which 
will contain this information will most probably be added when there is wider consensus among 
the members of the Iraqi parliament.
102 For further geographical information please consult Appendix B.
103 The amount will be regulated by law.
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FOGL was not adopted by the parliament. Furthermore, it does not seem to have any 
supporters  left  to  fight  for  it  (Said,2007:  8-12;  Earth  Times,  2007;  Swift,  2007; 
Jasiewicz, 2008; Jasiewicz, 2007; Stewart, 2007; Goodman, 2007). The situation has 
been exacerbated by the interference of the Western powers. Significant segments of 
the Iraqi society are viewing the creation of new contracts as a repetition of Iraq's 
history. Thus the public opinion in turn is mounting significant opposition to any 
deals signed with the foreign energy companies. 
 The  interference  came  in  different  forms.  In  2008  the  IMO  had  opened 
certain oil and gas fields for bidding.104 The initial reports in June 2008 indicated 
that the major actors in the energy industry were not to participate in negotiations 
with the IMO This was linked to the fact that there was not enough incentive and 
secure environment for the MNCs to invest in Iraqi oil industry. Yet by November 
2008 the situation had changed. British Petroleum (BP), Exxon and Royal Dutch 
Shell (Shell) entered into negotiations for eight Iraqi oil fields. This represented 40 
percent  of  the  oil  reserve  of  the  entire  Middle  Eastern  region  (Webb,  2008; 
Macalister and Watt, 2008).
 One of the reason for the opposition and resentment among the majority of 
Iraq's population was the cloud of secrecy surrounding negotiation process.105 The 
mistrust in the public towards the oil deals was enhanced due to the news that the 
Iraqi  government  was  under  pressure  form  the  British  and  US  administrations. 
Furthermore, there were reports stating that the deals were made with the guidance 
104 The draft FOGL does stipulate this. 
105The Iraqi government attempted to rectify this problem during a June 2009 oil and gas auction. 
The auction was broadcasted on television the entire day. This was an attempt to stop the criticism 
regarding the secrecy surrounding the oil and gas contracts (Williams, 2009).
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of American advisers  (Kramer, 2008a; Kramer, 2008b).
 Within  this  framework,  the  Iraqi  nationalism  has  been  on  the  rise  and 
presenting to an extent pressure on oil and gas deals. For example, in September 
2008, Shell was awarded a natural gas contract. Shell was willing to pay 4 billion 
dollars for a reserve that was valued at 40 billion dollars. There was resistance to 
this contract from the beginning.106 Yet by 2009 the resistance had escalated to full 
blown threats. By April 2009, key members of the Iraqi Parliament began to promise 
to revoke any present and future deals with made with foreign energy companies. 
(Macalister, 2008; Macalister, 2009).
 The threats uttered by the key members of Iraqi parliament also shined light 
on  another  problematic  issue,  the  jurisdiction  on  oil  and  gas  sector.  Neither  the 
constitution nor the draft  FOGL was able to structure an understandable system, 
with clear roles for each Iraqi entity. Thus, as the key members of the parliament 
uttered their threats towards the signed deals with foreign energy companies, the 
IMO declared that it did not need approval from the parliament to sign any deals 
with foreign energy companies  (Macalister, 2009).
 This  is  not the only jurisdictional  trouble  the Iraqi  system faces.  Another 
problem that is  growing by each day is  the dispute between the KRG under the 
control  of   the  parties  of  Mesut  Barzani  and Jalal  Talabani.  Since 2007,  the oil 
production from the northern fields began to increase.107 By 2009, the KRG had 
106 Despite the fact that Iraq could loose over 30 billion dollars, there were also other objections. For 
example one of the objections was the secrecy surrounding the deal.
107 According  to  a  report  prepared  by  the  Office  of  the  Special  Inspector  General  for  Iraq 
Reconstruction  (SIGIR), the oil production in the North rose from an average of 1 million barrels 
per month to more 13 million barrels a month.  For more detailed production numbers please 
consult Appendix C (Tavernise, 2008; SIGIR 2008).
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signed petroleum deals with the foreign energy companies.108 By June 2009, reports 
and comments began to surface that the IMO had given implicit consent to the KRG 
deals and its export  of oil.  The reports further stated this action showed that the 
low-on-cash government in Baghdad was accepting the interpretation of the KRG on 
the  matters  of  jurisdiction  regarding  natural  resources.  However,  later  reporting 
stated that the dispute between the central government and the KRG had still not 
been resolved. The IMO has denied the such  reports and stated that the deals made 
by the KRG were illegal  (Tavernise, 2008; Abbas, 2009b; Abbas, 2009c; Abbas, 
2009d;  Alaaldin, 2009; Rasheed and Web, 2009b).
 The parties still have not resolved the issue of what percentage the Regions, 
Governorates and the Baghdad will receive from the oil revenues. Nevertheless, the 
revenue sharing procedure is in a quite different state then the issue of jurisdiction. 
This is because one issue does seem to be resolved. This is the fact that the money 
earned from any contracts  will  be  deposited  to  the  Federal  Ministry of  Finance 
(MoF) in Baghdad.109 In response to the agreements made by the KRG, the IMO 
stated that the agreements were illegal and that the  foreign energy companies that 
operated the fields would not get paid. The official response from the KRG stated 
that the money would be deposited to the MoF. By June 2009, the payment for the 
108  As  of  September  2008  these  companies  are:  DNO  (Norway),  Addax  Petroleum 
(Canada/Switzerland), Genel Enerji (Turkey), Western Zagros (Canada), Pet Oil (Turkey), Prime 
Natural Resources (U.S.), Oil Search (Australia), Crescent Petroleum (UAE), Dana Gas (UAE), 
Norbest (an affiliate of TNK-BP of Russia),  OMV Petroleum Exploration (Austria), Hunt Oil 
(U.S.),  Hillwood  International  Energy  (U.S.),  Perenco  (France),  Aspect  Energy  (U.S.),  Gulf 
Keystone Petroleum (UK), Texas Keystone (U.S.), Kalegran/MOL (Hungary), Reliance Energy 
(India),  Heritage Oil  and Gas (Canada),  Sterling Energy International  (U.S.),  Niko Resources 
(Canada),  Vast  Exploration  (Canada),  Groundstar  Resources  (Canada),  Korea  National  Oil 
Corporation (South Korea) and Talisman Energy (Canada) (Ipek, 2009, 18).
109 This includes the percentages of the Regions and Governorates.
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future  of  KRG contracts  were  still  unclear.  (Abbas,  2009d;  Firch  and  Moskwa, 
2009).
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 CHAPTER V
CONCLUSION
 This thesis evaluates the important factors that have an influence during the 
state  building  process  and  how they are  addressed  in  the  mainstream literature. 
Accordingly,  there  are  three  mainstream  approaches,  namely  the  Fast-Track 
Democratization (FTD), Security Firsters (SF) and the Slow Democratization (SD). 
Moreover,  given  the  lessons  learned  from cases  in  the  history of  state  building 
activities, three major factors are determined as important in the process. These are 
the level of engagement, regional factors, and legitimacy. Iraq is analyzed as a case 
study of state building, to examine the role of natural resources in the state building 
process.
In chapter two, according to the historical examples investigated under the 
three state building actors, namely the US, the UN, and the European countries, the 
most  successful  approach  seems  to  be  the  SD  approach.  Compared  to  other 
examples, the case of Bosnia, East Slavonia, Kosovo, and Namibia have experienced 
more  successful  state  building processes.  The state  building processes  under  the 
other two approaches have experienced more difficulties. For example, this could be
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observed from the  case  studies  of  Afghanistan,  Sierra  Leone,  Cote  D'Ivoire  and 
Congo.  Furthermore,  some state  building processes under  these approaches  have 
failed. The RoV and Somalia are two such examples. 
The success of the SD approach seems to be related to its interpretation of the 
three  contingent  factors.  For  example,  unlike  the  two  other  approaches  it  does 
consider the regional factors as important, and does place more emphasis on the 
issue of legitimacy. Furthermore, on the factor of level of engagement, it argues for a 
multidimensional approach. Thus, it places emphasis on political will and civilian 
scope of the operation.
In chapter three, the importance of the historical trajectory of state building 
could  be  seen  in  the  case  of  Iraq.  The  foundation  laid  by  the  British  imperial 
administration in the 1920s and 1930s have shaped the coming decades of Iraqi 
politics.  Consequently,  unless  the  historical  trajectory of  state  building  efforts  is 
thoroughly analyzed, the state building process could be hampered.
Such negative effects are presented in chapter four. The historical trajectory 
of Iraq has shown that there are three important specific and contingent factors in the 
case of Iraq. These are the issues of national identity, the IAF and the production and 
ownership of oil, and the distribution of the oil revenues. Yet, the US by ignoring the 
Iraq specific contingent factors, presented in chapter three, and the general lessons 
learned from the state building efforts, presented in chapter two, has hampered its 
own state building efforts.
The prior state building efforts have shown that the SD approach for now 
seems to be most suitable approach at hand. The Iraqi case shows the validity of SDs 
arguments by providing the reader with seven important lessons for the successful 
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completion of a state building effort.
First, as the Iraqi case presents that without security the pace of the state 
building effort is seriously slowed. Second, in order to ensure security, the monopoly 
of  violence  must  remain  with  the  state.110 Third,  in  order  to  create  the  above 
mentioned  secure  environment,  a  system (democratic  or  not)  can  initially  focus 
primarily on security related issues. Fourth, a newly created state, even in its infancy 
must  contain  pluralistic  elements.111 Fifth,  the  problems  associated  with  the 
establishment of a democratically elected government does not negate its value in a 
successful state building process. Sixth, the creation of even a vague constitution can 
improve  the  situation  by providing the  actors  of  the  state  building  process  with 
certain legitimacy. Seventh, the Iraqi case shows that the lack of or the inadequate 
nature of economic and social programs could demolish all the gains made through 
the creation of a constitutional democracy.112
Despite its strengths, the SD approach does omit certain elements that could 
110This was also stated in the definition of the term “state”. This requires the dissolution of all  non 
governmental armed entities in a country  If this is not done properly, this  can, as it was the case 
in Iraq, be even the cause for civil war.
111 Thus, even if the state builders focus on primarily security related issues, the legitimacy issue 
cannot be overlooked. Also, this is especially important in divided societies. This division might 
be in the form of ethnicity, denomination, religion etc. A pluralistic environment provides a place 
of growth for any and all identities present  in the region which is subjected to state building 
process. However, they must not be allowed to threaten the identity that binds the nation together. 
In the case of Iraq this can be seen with the example of KRG. The KRG was given special rights 
and attention during the establishment of the new Iraq state. In the constitution, the only other 
entity besides the federal government and Baghdad is the KRG. This might seem as an approach 
of respecting different identities. Yet it only feeds the secessionist tendencies of the Iraqi Kurdish 
segment of the society. This in turn has several detrimental affects. One of these negative effects 
is that it increases the chance of discrimination. As it was seen with the statement of the KRG, 
which had opposed the presence of non Iraqi Kurdish soldiers in the north. This might further feed 
the secessionist tendencies of a certain segment of the society. In the case of Iraq, the international 
community was faced with the fact of population distortion attempts by the KRG. These lessons 
learned from the Iraqi case are important parts of a democratic state.
112 This  could  be  seen  during  the  rehabilitation  program  of  former  IAF   members.  After  the 
dissolution of the IAF, many officer and soldiers could not find jobs. This in turn forced them to 
join anti-government forces. Thus the strength of the insurgency grew.
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also be important for the state building activity. One of these elements and the focus 
of this thesis is the importance of the state contingencies and the historical trajectory 
of state building. The presence of natural resources can be beneficial to the state 
building process. However, if these resources are not handled well they can also hurt 
the process, and cause the eventual collapse of the state building operation. 
This  thesis  provides  the  reader  with  lessons  regarding  the  importance  of 
natural resources in a state building project. First, safeguarding of democracy against 
tyranny and role of natural resources are important. If Iraq did not have important 
natural resources certain segments of the society would find it harder to achieve their 
divisive aims.  Also,  the conflict  caused by the presence of different  identities  is 
increased with the presence of natural resources. If Kerkük did not hold a significant 
quantity  of  the  Iraqi  Oil  reserves,  it  is  doubtful  that  different  identities  would 
compete for the ownership of such a town. Similarly, it might be argued that as the 
management of the natural resources is distributed among different segments of a 
society,  there  will  be  less  chance  for  any  one  entity  to  capture  the  state  and 
eventually establishing an undemocratic system. 
Second lesson is regarding the importance of a centralized system in natural 
resource rich developing countries with no tradition of democracy. Natural resource 
rich  environment  could  exacerbate  secessionist  demands  if  the  control  over  the 
natural resources is decentralized among different segments of the society. This is 
the case in Iraq. The north is trying to use the implied decentralized system for its 
own benefit. This in turn deprives resource poor Governorates from much needed 
funding  for  their  development  projects.  Consequently, this  presents  us  the 
importance of a centralized structure for the management of natural  resources in 
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state-building process.
 The importance of safeguarding against  such possibilities113 is  important. 
However,  the  decentralization  of  the  management  structure  for  natural  resources 
should not be considered as means in achieving this. The decentralization in itself is 
not  a  significant  safeguard.  Furthermore,  it  could  produce  the  opposite  effect  in 
smaller scale. One example is the monopoly on the political scene of the regional 
leaders of Iraq. The natural resources funds could be used to create smaller, yet still 
authoritarian systems. Even if the democratic reforms would safeguard democracy in 
a state building process, decentralization of the control over natural resources do not 
necessarily guarantee the establishment of a  more democratic state. This is because 
interest groups in decentralized regions may continue to be authoritarian and sustain 
rentier-distributive nature of their rule to legitimize and consolidate their power by 
oil wealth controlled in their hand.
In  conclusion,  this  paper  has  demonstrated  that  natural  resources  play an 
important  in a Iraq's  state  building process.  The funds received from the natural 
resources can provide important help for a state building process. Yet it was also 
demonstrated that their use is of limited nature. If the structure for the ownership, 
management and the distribution of revenues of the natural resources is not set up 
properly, they could be instrumental in hampering the state building process.
113 Possibilities such as  secessionist demands and the consequent violence to power over the natural 
resources.
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